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Abstract: Cognitive models of Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD; e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995) 
have implicated anticipatory processing, an anxiety-related form of repetitive negative 
thinking, in the maintenance of SAD symptoms.  However, research has yet to examine 
potential mechanisms responsible for symptom maintenance.  In the current study, 
participants high (HSA; N = 45) and low (LSA; N = 45) in social anxiety symptoms 
engaged in either an anticipatory processing or distraction task and then completed verbal 
and visual working memory tasks.  HSAs who engaged in anticipatory processing 
demonstrated lower performance on the visual working memory task relative to the other 
groups, suggesting that anticipatory processing impairs visual working memory.  There 
were no differences among any groups on verbal working memory task scores.  This 
study advances the literature on the importance of imagery in SAD.  It also underscores 
importance of examining anticipatory processing in the social anxiety and repetitive 
negative thinking literatures. 
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Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is characterized by fear of negative evaluation in 
social interactions and/or performance situations (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013).  It is among one of the most commonly diagnosed anxiety disorders, with over 25 
million individuals affected (Kessler, Petukhova, Sampson, Zaslavsky, & Wittchen, 
2012).  Those with SAD experience poorer outcomes in most life domains, including 
economic, academic, occupational, social, medical, and psychological (Leon, Portera, & 
Weissman, 1995; Mogotsi, Kaminer, & Stein, 2000) functioning compared to matched 
healthy controls.  
Despite the prevalence and impairment associated with SAD, research has been 
somewhat limited until recently (Liebowitz, Gorman, Fyer, & Klein, 1985).  However, 
comprehensive models of SAD have gained empirical support in the last two decades.  
Specifically, cognitive models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) 
have implicated attention, interpretation, imagery, and repetitive negative thoughts in 
symptom maintenance.  Research supports the link between these domains and SAD 
(Amir & Bomyea, 2010), but the majority of studies have examined cognitive processes 
in isolation, despite findings that these processes interact (Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 
2006).  Therefore, the purpose of the current study was to integrate the literature on  
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attention, which is commonly studied in SAD, and anticipatory processing, which is a rarely-
studied repetitive negative thought style that has recently been implicated in SAD. 
 Cognitive research in SAD has drawn upon several basic models of attention.  
Baddeley (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2000) suggests that attention consists of the 
interaction between a phonological loop that stores and rehearses verbal information, a 
visuospatial sketchpad that stores and rehearses visual information, an episodic buffer that 
links the phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad (Baddeley, 2000), and a domain-
general central executive that is involved with attentional focusing, shifting, and inhibition.  
Studies examining anxiety from this framework have found that anxiety mostly impairs 
central executive performance (Coy, O’Brien, Tabaczynski, Northern, & Carels, 2011; 
Eysenck, Payne, & Derakshan, 2005), but the phonological loop also can be impaired if the 
anxiety results in verbal cognitions (e.g., negative-self talk; Coy et al., 2011).  Despite 
promising results examining the effect of anxiety on the phonological loop, research 
examining the influence of anxious imagery on visual working memory has been limited.  
Cowan (1999; 2005) proposed an alternative model of working memory that 
generally focused on characteristics and functions of processes that Baddeley labeled as the 
central executive.  Cowan (1999; 2005) suggested that attentional focus is limited in capacity 
and is controlled by both voluntary and involuntary processes.  For example, individuals can 
use conscious processes to focus attention on tasks, but salient (e.g., loud, novel) and/or self-
relevant (e.g., hearing your name) stimuli can automatically distract an individual’s attention 
from the target task.   
Both Baddeley’s and Cowan’s models suggest that attention is limited by capacity.  
Therefore, taxing working memory drains available resources, resulting in either impaired 
3 
 
performance or increased allocation of resources to maintain performance (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007).  Resource depletion appears to be domain-specific, such 
that engaging in purely verbal tasks mostly interferes with the phonological loop, but not the 
visuospatial sketchpad.  Similarly, engagement in purely visual tasks appears to primarily tax 
the visuospatial sketchpad (e.g., Baddeley, 2012).   
Research suggests that anxiety reduces attentional resources (Eysenck et al., 2007), 
resulting in automatic processes taking control of attention (Teachman, Joorman, Steinman, 
& Gotlib, 2012).  For example, Amir and Bomyea (2011) found that trait socially-anxious 
participants had poorer performance than nonanxious controls on a working memory task 
with neutral stimuli, suggesting reduced attentional control.  However, when the task was 
repeated with social-threat words (e.g., foolish, blushing), SAD participants demonstrated 
equal performance to nonanxious controls.  Furthermore, the SAD group had better task 
performance for threat words compared to neutral words, suggesting that threatening words 
were processed with greater ease (e.g., automatically).  These findings were consistent with 
the multitude of research that suggests socially-anxious individuals have biased processing 
toward threat-relevant stimuli (e.g., Schultz & Heimberg, 2008).  Therefore, reduced 
attentional control could be a mechanism of the maintenance of anxiety symptoms; however, 
more research is needed on factors that influence the relationship between anxious and 
attentional processes.  One such factor could be anticipatory processing.  
Clark and Wells (1995) suggested that individuals high in social anxiety symptoms 
(HSAs) engage in repetitious negative thought called anticipatory processing (AP) prior to 
social interactions.  AP has been hypothesized to include intrusive memories of past failures, 
negative images of the self, catastrophic images about what could go wrong during the 
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upcoming interaction, and plans to escape or avoid the interaction (Hinrichsen & Clark, 
2003).  Clark and Wells (1995) argued that AP results in an internal shift of attentional focus 
in order to monitor sensations of anxiety.  The function of this internal attentional shift is to 
facilitate the identification of physical signs of anxiety that could indicate to others that the 
HSA individual is anxious.  Ironically, as a result of this intense self-focused attention, HSAs 
become more anxious, attend less to the interaction, and experience a negative evaluation of 
the interaction (Clark & Wells, 1995).  This provides confirmatory evidence to HSAs that 
they lack social prowess, and this confirmation maintains their anxiety in social situations.  
AP research has determined that it results in anxiety (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; Schulz, 
Alpers, & Hofmann, 2008; Vassilopoulos, 2005; Wong & Moulds, 2011), negative self-
images (Vassilopoulos, 2005), self-focused attention, and negative interpretations (Mills, 
Grant, Judah, & Lechner, 2014; Mills, Grant, Judah, & White, 2014).  Mills and colleagues 
(2013) identified a two-factor model of a common measure of AP (Anticipatory Social 
Behaviours Questionnaire; Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003), which suggested that AP could serve 
both avoidance and preparatory functions.  In their study, those who tended to utilize the 
avoidance function experienced negative outcomes, whereas the preparatory function was 
unrelated to negative or positive outcomes (Mills, Grant, Lechner, & Judah, 2013).  
However, despite promising research, researchers have yet to test how AP maintains SAD.   
One approach to answering this and other questions may be to examine how 
processes interact with each other.  Researchers have yet to fully examine how cognitive 
processes interact, which significantly limits the extant research.  Recent research suggests 
that AP affects attention (Mills et al., 2014a; Mills et al., 2014b), but it is unclear how this 
leads to the maintenance of social anxiety.  One possibility may by that AP consumes 
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resources, leaving HSAs with fewer resources with which to devote to interactions.  
Although this was suggested almost twenty years ago (Clark & Wells, 1995), no research has 
examined the influence of AP on cognitive resources.  Similar questions in the worry (Hayes, 
Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008) and rumination (Joormann, Levens, & Gotlib, 2011) literatures 
suggest that those who tend to worry and ruminate experience impaired attentional resources 
during those processes (Hayes et al., 2008) or when attending to negative stimuli (Joormann 
et al., 2011).  Therefore, the first aim of the current study was to evaluate the degree to which 
anticipation results in task interference, which can implicate taxed attentional resources as a 
mechanism of symptom maintenance.   
Secondly, AP is hypothesized to consist of both verbal and imagery components 
(Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003), but this has not been tested.  Therefore, the second aim of this 
study was to examine impairment between verbal and visual tasks.  This information has 
important implications.  Verbal thought processes are hypothesized to facilitate cognitive 
avoidance from negative imagery (Borkovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004; Newman & Llera, 
2011), suggesting that one function of AP is to avoid distressing images.  This cognitive 
avoidance may serve as an attempt to prepare for the upcoming interaction by minimizing 
negative imagery.  On the other hand, image-based thought processes are associated with 
marked negative emotional responses (Lang & McTeague, 2009), suggesting that the 
function of AP could be to activate the fear response and facilitate behavioral avoidance.  
This would suggest that AP maintains social anxiety by preventing habituation or by 
preventing exposure to evidence that disconfirms the negative beliefs of HSAs.  By 
understanding the degree to which AP is verbal and/or image-based, this study can provide 
information about the function of the process and therefore inform treatment strategies.  This 
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question is particularly important, as SAD appears to fall in between acute fear-related 
anxiety disorders (e.g., specific phobia) and chronic anxious arousal disorders (e.g., 
generalized anxiety disorder; Lang & McTeague, 2009; McTeague & Lang, 2012; McTeague 
et al., 2009) based on psychophysiological reactions to fear-related imagery (i.e., skin 
conductance, heart rate variability, affective modulation of the startle response).   
A core tenant of attention models suggests that engaging in concurrent verbal tasks 
impairs phonological loop performance, but has minimal effects on visual tasks, and vice 
versa, suggesting that these systems are somewhat independent (e.g., Baddeley, 2012).  
Therefore, if the cognitive processes that occur during AP are primarily verbal, we would 
expect more impairment in verbal memory tasks compared to visual memory tasks.  
Similarly, if AP is primarily associated with intrusive imagery, we would expect more 
impairment in visual tasks relative to verbal tasks.   
A tertiary aim of the current study was to examine the effects of AP on physiological 
data.  Preliminary results of a pilot study in our lab suggest that individuals (N = 30) 
engaging in an AP task experience increases in skin conductance and decreases in respiratory 
sinus arrhythmia (RSA) relative to a relaxation task.  Other studies examining AP (Schulz et 
al., 2008; Wong & Moulds, 2011) have noted similar increases in skin conductance (Wong & 
Moulds, 2011) and decreases in RSA (Schulz et al., 2008), but no other studies have included 
psychophysiological assessment in the study of AP.  These data can provide information 
beyond anxiety, as physiological arousal can serve as an indicator of cognitive activity 
(Muth, Moss, Rosopa, Salley, & Walker, 2012), which could provide additional evidence that 
participants are indeed engaging in anticipatory thoughts.  
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In the current study, participants high (HSA) and low (LSA) in social anxiety 
engaged in an AP or distraction task prior to a perceived social interaction.  After engaging in 
anticipation or distraction, they completed counterbalanced visual and verbal cognitive load 
tasks.  It was expected that HSAs engaging in AP would demonstrate impaired performance 
on both tasks compared to HSAs in the distraction task and LSAs in either task (See Figure 
1).  Furthermore, because AP is hypothesized to be associated with distressing imagery, we 
expect visual task performance to be more impaired than verbal task performance for HSAs 
in the anticipation condition. For physiological data, it was expected that HSAs in the 
Anticipation condition would have the highest mean skin conductance and lowest mean RSA 
during the manipulation compared to other groups, which would suggest that they were 
experiencing the highest levels of anxiety as a result of the manipulation.  We also expect 









 Participants high and low in social anxiety symptoms were recruited from the 
participant pool at a large Midwestern university.  HSAs consisted of participants who 
scored at or above the cutoff (28) on the straightforward version of the Social Interaction 
Anxiety Scale (S-SIAS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998; Rodebaugh et al., 2011; Rodebaugh, 
Woods, & Heimberg, 2007).  LSAs consisted of participants who scored at or below 20, 
which is the mean score of primarily-Caucasian Midwestern college students.  
Participants were recruited based on their scores on the S-SIAS and were readministered 
the S-SIAS at the time of participation.  Out of the 114 individuals who participated in 
the study, 20 were removed from analyses because they no longer met criteria for HSA or 
LSA status based on their S-SIAS scores. Four participants were removed from analyses 
due to outliers (scores +3.29) on state affect questionnaires that were completed during 
the study.  Therefore, the final sample included 90 participants (45 HSA and 45 LSA).     
Participants had a mean age of 19.90 (SD = 3.50) and were primarily female (74.4%), 
heterosexual (96.3%), and Caucasian (73.3%).  HSA and LSA participants were equally 
distributed across conditions (p = 1.00) and had equal sex distribution (p = .60). 
Similarly, men and women were equally represented across conditions (p = .55).  There
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were no significant differences in age, trait social anxiety, AP, depression, rumination, 
worry, generalized anxiety disorder symptoms, attentional control, cognitive failures, 
state distress, or state positive affect (ps ranged from .07 for cognitive failures and .10 for 
depression to .95 for social anxiety; see Table 1).  Therefore, it appears that random 
condition assignment was successful.  However, those in the Anticipation condition had 
significantly higher state negative affect at the beginning of the study (i.e., “Time 1”) 
than those in the Distraction condition (p = .02).  This cannot be explained by differences 
in conditions, as the manipulation had not occurred at this point in the study.  Therefore, 
we controlled for Time 1 negative affect for our primary analyses in order to rule it out as 
a confound.  
 The HSA and LSA groups differed on all trait symptom and repetitive negative 
thinking measures (all ps < .005), with HSAs consistently scoring higher (see Table 2). 
HSAs also reported more cognitive failures (p < .001).  There was no difference in 
attentional control (p = .09) scores.  HSAs had lower state positive and higher state 
negative affect at the beginning of the study, but HSAs and LSAs did not differ in state 
subjective distress (p = .44). See Table 2 for more details.  
 A priori power analyses were conducted based on a 2 (Condition; Anticipation, 
Control) X 2 (SA Group; HSA, LSA) X 2 (Task Order; Verbal First, Visual First) design.  
Similar studies in our laboratory have resulted in interaction effect sizes (f) of 
approximately .40.  To achieve this effect size with this design, it was estimated that a 
sample of 74 (37 HSA, 37 LSA) participants will be needed.  Therefore, our sample of 90 




 Participants completed several self-report questionnaires to assess for trait 
symptoms of AP and other forms of repetitive negative thought (i.e., worry and 
rumination), trait symptoms of social anxiety and depression, and everyday difficulties 
with attention and memory.  These measures included: 
 Anticipatory Social Behaviours Questionnaire (ASBQ; Hinrichsen & Clark, 
2003; Appendix C).  The ASBQ is a 12-item measure that assesses the degree to which 
individuals engage in AP prior to a social interaction.  Items are scored on a 1 (Never) to 
4 (Always) scale. The total scale (α = .83 to .88) and Avoidance subscale (α = .82) have 
been shown to have good internal consistency, whereas the reliability of the Preparation 
subscale (α = .73) seems to be adequate (Mills et al., 2013). The reliability in the current 
study was excellent for the full ASBQ (α = .91) and good for the Avoidance (α = .85) and 
Preparation (α = .83) subscales.  
Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Appendix D).  
The ACS is a 20-item measure that assesses trait attentional focusing and shifting.  Items 
are rated on a 1 (Almost Never) to 4 (Always) scale.  Reliability for the full scale (α = 
.82) and Focusing subscale are good (α = .81 to .82) and reliability for the Shifting 
subscale is adequate (α = .71 to .73; Judah, Grant, Mills & Lechner, 2014).  In the current 
study, the reliability of the full scale was good (α = .81) and adequate for the Focusing (α 
= .78) and Shifting (α = .71) subscales.  
 Center for Epidemiological Studies - Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 
1977; Appendix E).  The CES-D is a 20-item measure that assesses depressive 
symptoms experienced during the previous week.  Responses range from 0 (Rarely or 
none of the time) to 3 (Most or all of the time).  The CES-D has been found to have good 
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internal consistency (α = .85 for general population and .90 for a clinical sample; 
Radloff, 1977). It had excellent (α = .90) reliability in the current study).  
 Cognitive Failures Questionnaire (CFQ; Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & 
Parkes, 1982; Appendix F).  The CFQ is a 25-item measure that assesses common 
cognitive lapses in everyday life (e.g., failing to listen to people’s names when meeting 
them, forgetting appointments).  Items are rated on a 0 (Never) to 4 (Very Often) scale.  
The CFQ has good internal consistency (Broadbent et al., 1982). In the current study, the 
reliability of the CFQ was excellent (α = .91).  
Demographics Form (Appendix G).  The demographics form assessed 
participants’ gender identity, LBGT identification, age, ethnicity, birthplace, primary 
language, GPA, and year in school.  
Extended Post-Event Processing Questionnaire (E-PEPQ; Fehm, Hoyer, 
Schneider, Lindemann, & Klustmann; 2008; Appendix H).  The E-PEPQ is an 18-
item measure that is an extension and psychometric improvement upon the original Post-
Event Processing Questionnaire (Rachman, Grueter-Andrew, & Shafran, 2000).  This 
measure asks participants to think of a recent negative social event and answer questions 
related to that event.  The E-PEPQ has been found to have high internal consistency (α = 
.90; Fehm et al., 2008). In the current study, reliability was excellent (α = .96).  
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990; Appendix I). The PSWQ is a 16-item measure that assesses frequency 
of worry.  Items are rated on a 1 (Never) to 5 (Always) scale.  The PSWQ has excellent 
internal consistency (α > .90; Meyer et al., 1990). For the current study, the reliability of 
the PSWQ was also excellent (α = .94).  
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Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; 
Treynor, Gonzales, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003; Appendix J).  Treynor and colleagues 
(2003) revised the original RRS (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) by removing items 
that were confounded with depressive symptoms, resulting in a scale that only assessed 
rumination as a cognitive process. The revised RRS contains 10 items and assesses 
ruminative thoughts that map onto two subscales, Brooding (negatively-valenced and 
self-blaming) and Reflection (nonjudgmental and focused on problem-solving).  
Responses range from 1 (Almost Never) to 4 (Almost Always).  The revised RRS has 
good internal consistency (α = .90; Treynor et al., 2003).  In the current study, reliability 
was good for the full scale (α = .89), the Brooding subscale (α = .83), and the Reflection 
subscale (α = .85).  
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Straightforward Version (S-SIAS; Mattick 
& Clarke, 1998: Rodebaugh et al., 2007; Rodebaugh et al., 2011; Appendix K).  The 
S-SIAS is a 17-item assessment of anxiety experienced during social interactions.  The S-
SIAS is a modified version of Mattick and Clarke’s (1998) original SIAS.  Rodebaugh 
and colleagues (2007) found that reverse-scored items on the SIAS reduced construct 
validity and suggested dropping the items from the scale.  The S-SIAS has excellent 
internal consistency (α = .93; Rodebaugh et al., 2007; 2011).  In the current study, 
reliability was also excellent (α = .93). 
The following measures were given to participants at various times throughout the 
study (see Figure 2).  
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988; Appendix L).  The PANAS was used as a measure of state affect several times 
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throughout the study.  The PANAS consists of 10 positive affect (e.g., enthusiastic, 
inspired, relaxed) and 10 negative affect (e.g., anxious, hostile, angry) items that are rated 
on a 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Extremely) scale.  Participants were asked to rate how they feel at 
the current moment.  This scale can be completed quickly and is psychometrically strong, 
despite its brevity (Watson et al., 1988).  Participants completed the PANAS with the 
trait questionnaires at the beginning of the study (Time 1), after the AP or Distraction 
Tasks (Time 2), and at the end of the study (Time 3).  Reliability ranged from good-to-
excellent for both scales at all three time points. For the Positive Affect subscale, α = .90 
at Time 1, .91 at Time 2, and .89 at Time 3. For Negative Affect, α = .84 at Time 1, .82 at 
Time 2, and .82 at Time 3.  
Subjective Units of Distress (SUDS).  Participants were asked to rate the extent 
to which they felt “either anxious, nervous, uncomfortable, or distressed” on a scale that 
ranged from 0 (no discomfort) to 100 (intense discomfort).  Similar assessments have 
been used in other studies of AP (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; Mills et al., 2014a; Schulz et 
al., 2008; Wong & Moulds, 2011).  This question was administered during the same three 
time points as the PANAS.  At Time 1, participants were asked to rate their current 
distress “at the moment,” because they were not informed about the social interaction 
until later in the study.  At Time 2 and Time 3, participants were asked to rate their 
current distress “about the upcoming social interaction.”  
Strategy Use Questionnaire (STQ; Brown & Wesley, 2013; Appendix M).  
The STQ is a 5-item measure that assesses the degree to which participants used visual or 
verbal strategies during the completion of a task.  The STQ was developed to be used 
with the modified Visual Patterns Test (VPT; Brown, et al., 2006).  For the current study, 
14 
 
a second, modified version of the STQ was constructed and administered after the verbal 
task as well.   
Manipulation Check Questionnaire (Appendix N). The manipulation check 
questionnaire is a 20-item measure generated by the researchers and used in previous 
studies (Mills et al., 2014a; Mills, Grant, Judah, & White, 2014).  The first question 
displays 18 prompts to participants and asks them to indicate whether they were asked to 
think about each prompt during the study.  Six of the prompts consisted of the prompts 
from the Anticipation condition, six consisted of the prompts from the Distraction 
condition, and the remaining six were filler prompts.  The filler prompts consisted of 
three rumination prompts and three distraction prompts taken from Nolen-Hoeksema and 
Morrow (1993).  
Another manipulation check question asked participants to rate the extent to 
which they were thinking about the prompts during the attention tasks using a 0 (I did not 
think about the prompts at all during the tasks) to 10 (I thought of the prompts the entire 
time I completed the task) scale (Mills et al., 2014a; Mills et al., 2014b).  
Early in the study, participants were informed that they would be engaging in a 
social interaction later in the study; however, no interaction took place.  In order to 
determine the extent to which participants believed the interaction was going to happen, a 
final manipulation check question asked participants to rate how much they believed that 
an interaction would take place on a 0 (I was completely convinced there would NOT be 
an interaction) to 10 (I was completely convinced there WOULD be an interaction) scale 
(Mills et al., 2014a; Mills et al., 2014b).  Because this question confirms that no 




Each participant completed the informed consent process with the researcher.  
Then, participants completed the aforementioned trait questionnaires, which were 
administered via computer.  After the participant completed the questionnaires, the 
researcher escorted him/her to a desk that contains a monitor, mouse, and intercom.  
Physiological Hook-Up.  Physiological data were collected using the BIOPAC 
MP150 hardware system and AcqKnowledge 4.0 data acquisition and analysis software.  
Electrocardiograph (heart rate) data was recorded by three electrodes.  Electrodes were 
placed in a three-lead configuration, consistent with previous literature (Porges, 2007).  
The experimenter demonstrated the correct placement of electrodes and then left the 
room while the participant placed them on himself/herself.  The participant 
communicated with the researcher via intercom to let the researcher know when the 
electrodes have been placed. For skin conductance, electrodes were placed on the middle 
segment of the 1st and 3rd fingers.  The overall sampling rate was set at 1000 Hz, which 
matched the highest sampling rate needed for the study (heart rate).  Before beginning 
any study tasks, the researchers ensured that the electrodes were working properly.   
Relaxation. To allow habituation to the electrodes, the participant was instructed 
to engage in a 5 minute relaxation period.   
 Social Threat.  After the relaxation period, participants were told that later in the 
study they would be engaging in a social interaction with a researcher in order to examine 
their social skills.  Because AP is hypothesized to influence HSAs prior to a social 
interaction, it was important that they believed that a social interaction was upcoming 
while they engaged in AP.  
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Manipulation.  The participant was then instructed to engage in AP or a 
distraction task, depending on their random condition assignment.  Those in the 
Anticipation condition saw six AP instructions (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003) on a computer 
screen (Appendix B).  Participants in the distraction condition saw six prompts about 
random stimuli (e.g., “Think about the shape of a black umbrella,” “Think about the 
baggage claim area at the airport”).  Prompts were displayed individually for 45 seconds 
each, for a total of 4.5 minutes.  The color, size, location, and duration of the prompts 
were equivalent between conditions.  After the prompts, participants completed the 
PANAS and SUDS.  
This manipulation has been successfully used in the past (Mills et al., 2014a; 
Mills et al., 2014b) to induce AP in those assigned to the Anticipation condition and to 
generally prevent participants from engaging in AP during the Distraction condition.  
 Attention Tasks.  Participants completed separate visual and verbal working 
memory load tasks during the study.  The visual task was the Visual Patterns Test (VPT) 
used by Brown and colleagues (2006) that consists of ambiguous patterns that cannot 
easily be encoded verbally.  For each trial of this task, participants viewed a fixation 
cross for one second, followed by the stimulus image, which is a matrix of varying 
complexity, for 3 seconds, followed by a blank slide for 10 seconds, followed by an 
untimed slide with an empty matrix that matches the size and shape of the original 
stimulus matrix (see Figure 3).  Participants used a computer mouse to click in the cells 
that were previously presented in black.  Research assistants used a template form to 
mark correct cells and trials as the participant completed the task.  The dimensions of the 
matrices ranged from 2 x 2 to 5 x 6.  The matrices were designed to prevent the use of 
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verbal strategies.  For example, the cells in each matrix are arranged so they do not 
resemble letters, words, shapes, or figures (Brown et al., 2006).  
 The verbal task was based on Joorman and colleagues (2011).  During this task, 
participants saw a fixation cross for one second, then 3-7 neutral words for three seconds, 
a black screen for 10 seconds, and then an untimed slide with the word “Recall.” 
Participants repeated the words back in the order in which they were presented (see 
Figure 3).  Research assistants listened to the participant through an intercom and marked 
whether individual words and entire trials were recalled successfully.  The words were 
chosen from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW) database (Bradley & 
Lang, 1999).  Words in the ANEW database vary by arousal level, affective valence, and 
length.  For the current study, words that were 5-7 characters long and rated as 
unarousing and affectively neutral were randomly chosen for this task. For both the visual 
and verbal tasks, participants completed 45 trials of varying complexity with a 30 second 
break after the 15th and 30th trial. 
 The tasks were counterbalanced, so some participants completed the visual task 
first, whereas the others completed the verbal task first.  After both tasks were completed, 
participants completed the STQ once for each task.  Each version of the STQ had slightly 
modified wording from the original version to specify for which task the STQ should be 
completed.  Participants also completed the PANAS and SUDS at this time.  
 Manipulation Check.  Participants were asked to complete the manipulation 
check questionnaire after completing both of the attention tasks.  Then, the researcher 
informed the participants that there would not actually be a social interaction and 
administered the Belief in Interaction question.   
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 Debriefing.  At the end of the study, the researcher instructed the participant how 
to remove the electrodes. The researcher explained the nature of the study and provided 










 Data were cleaned as suggested by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007).  Skewness and 
kurtosis values were examined in order to assume normality of the data, with skewness 
values of > |2.0| and kurtosis values > |4.0| used as cutoffs.  The PANAS Negative Affect 
scale had skewness and kurtosis values that exceeded these cutoffs at both Time 1 and 
Time 2. After participants with significant outliers (z +/-|3.29|) were removed from these 
analyses (N = 4), no variables exceeded either of these metrics of non-normality. No 
other outliers were identified in the data. 
Levene’s test was used to examine variance homogeneity for each analysis, 
although the analyses were robust to violations of homogeneity of variance because the 
ratio of largest-to-smallest cell size was 1:1, which did not exceed the 4:1 cutoff 
recommended by Tabachnick and Fidell (2007).  
Attention Task Performance 
A 2 (Condition; Anticipation, Control) X 2 (Group; HSA, LSA) X 2 (Task Order; 
Verbal First, Visual First) mixed MANCOVA was used to examine the differences in 
task performance (i.e., number of correct trials) between social anxiety groups, 
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conditions, and the interaction of the two.  MANCOVA was used due to the 
interdependence of visual and verbal cognitive load scores (r = .30, p = .005; Stevens, 
2009), and due to significant differences between conditions in Time 1 Negative Affect, 
this variable was added as a covariate. Levene’s test was not significant for Verbal and 
Visual trial scores (both ps = .45). Box’s test also was not significant (p = .60), 
suggesting that covariance matrices did not differ.  
There was a significant SA Group X Condition interaction (F[2, 80] = 3.56, p = 
.03, η2 = .08) that was specific to the Visual task (F[1, 81] = 7.04, p = .01, η2 = .08).  The 
SA Group X Condition interaction was not significant for Verbal task scores (p = .73; see 
Figure 4).  Follow-up analyses with Bonferroni correction revealed that, as hypothesized, 
HSAs in the Anticipation condition (M = 19.64, SD = 4.54) had lower Visual task scores 
than LSAs in the Anticipation condition (M = 22.66, SD = 4.42; p = .03), but scores did 
not differ between HSAs and LSAs in the Distraction condition (p = .17).  Similarly, 
HSAs in the Anticipation condition had significantly lower Visual task scores than HSAs 
in the Distraction condition (M = 22.43, SD = 4.36; p = .04), but LSAs’ scores did not 
differ between conditions (p = .12; Figure 4). 
There was a main effect of Task Order (F[2, 80] = 3.56, p = .03, η2 = .08) that was 
specific to the Verbal task (p < .01), such that participants had higher scores on the 
Verbal task when they completed it first (M = 9.92, SD = 2.87) compared to when they 
completed it after the Visual task (M = 8.24, SD = 3.00).  However, Task Order did not 
interact with any other factors (ps range from .44 to .66).  There were no other significant 
main effects or interactions. 
Subjective Distress (SUDS) 
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 For SUDS scores, Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was significant, suggesting that 
the error covariance matrices between various levels of the repeated-measures DVs were 
not equal.  Therefore, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used for these analyses 
(Stevens, 2009).   
 There was a significant Time X SA Group interaction for SUDS (F[1.57, 134.85) 
= 18.48, p < .001, η2 = .18). Follow-up analyses with Bonferroni correction revealed no 
difference in Time 1 SUDS levels between SA Groups (p = .45), but HSAs reported 
higher SUDS values at Times 2 (M = 33.24, SD = 24.43) and 3 (M = 33.44, SD = 22.10) 
relative to LSAs (M = 12.91, SD = 15.80 and M = 16.16, SD = 20.56, respectively; ps 
both < .001).  LSAs experienced a significant drop in SUDS from Time 1 to Time 2 (p < 
.001) that did not change at Time 3 (p = .35), whereas HSAs’ SUDS did not change from 
Time 1 to Time 2 (p = .10) or from Time 2 to Time 3 (p = 1.00).   
 There also was a significant SUDS X Condition interaction (F[1.57, 134.85] = 
3.24, p < .05, η2 = .07).  Follow-up analyses with Bonferroni correction found that 
participants in the Anticipation and Distraction conditions did not differ in SUDS scores 
at Time 1 (p = .62), but those in the Anticipation condition had higher (p = < .01) SUDS 
ratings at Time 2 (M = 28.87, SD = 24.21) and marginally higher (p = .07) SUDS ratings 
at Time 3 (M =  28.87, SD = 25.09) compared to those in the Distraction condition (M = 
17.29, SD = 20.07; M = 20.64, SD = 21.91, respectively).  Over the course of the study, 
those in the Anticipation condition had minimal change in SUDS scores (ps = 1.0), but 
those in the Distraction condition experienced a significant drop from Time 1 to Time 2 
(p < .01) and no change from Time 2 to Time 3 (p = .32).  
State Affect (PANAS) 
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 Because of the unexplained Time 1 difference in Negative Affect between 
conditions, analyses were not performed for the remaining time points.  For Positive 
Affect (PA), there were no significant effects.  
Physiology 
 For physiological analyses, the study was divided into five separate time points, 
corresponding to the main tasks of the study. These included Task 1 (Relaxation), Task 2 
(Social Threat and Manipulation/Thinking Prompts), Task 3 (Attention Task 1), Task 4 
(Attention Task 2) and Task 5 (Final Measures).  
Mauchly’s Test of Sphericity was again significant (p < .001) for both SC and 
RSA analyses, so Greenhouse-Geisser corrections were used in both cases. There were no 
significant two- or three-way interactions between Time, SA Group, and/or Condition for 
mean skin conductance (SC) scores, and, contrary to expectations, there were no main 
effects for SA Group (p = .85) or Condition (p = .79).  There was a main effect for Task 
(F[1.53, 128.23] = 130.01, p < .001, η2 = .61).  Specifically, skin conductance 
significantly increased at each time point (all ps < .001) except between Tasks 4 and 5 (p 
= 1.00).  
For RSA, after Greenhouse-Geisser corrections, there were two marginally-
significant interactions for Task X SA Group (p = .07) and Task X Condition (p = .07).  
For the Task X SA Group interaction, HSAs had marginally lower RSA values at Task 2 
(p = .07) than LSAs, but their RSA did not differ at any other time points.  LSAs 
experienced no significant change in RSA throughout the study (ps ranged from .15 to 
1.00), but HSAs experienced a significant drop from Task 1 to Task 2 (p < .001), a 
significant increase from Task 2 to Task 3 (p = .01), no change between Tasks 3 and 4 
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(the attention tasks; p = 1.00), and then another significant drop from Task 4 to Task 5 (p 
= .01).  
For the Task X Condition interaction, those in the Anticipation and Distraction 
conditions did not have any significant differences at any time point (ps ranged from .26 
to .72).  Throughout the study, those in both conditions experienced drops in RSA from 
Task 1 to Task 2 (Anticipation p < .001, Distraction p = .03), but those in the 
Anticipation condition experienced no additional significant changes during the study.  
On the other hand, those in the Distraction condition experienced a significant increase in 
RSA from Task 2 to Task 3 (p = .01), no change between Tasks 3 and 4 (p = 1.00) and a 
significant drop from Tasks 4 to 5 (p < .05).  
Manipulation Checks 
 The physiological data and SUDS data suggest that the manipulation was 
effective. Specifically, those in the Anticipation condition reported higher SUDS ratings 
after the manipulation (and a marginally higher SUDS rating prior to the social 
interaction) than those in the Distraction condition.  Furthermore, those in the 
Anticipation condition demonstrated a decrease in RSA during the manipulation that 
remained unchanged throughout the study, whereas those in the Distraction condition 
demonstrated a significant increase in RSA during the attention tasks, potentially 
suggesting a decrease in anxiety during those tasks. 
 Belief in Interaction.  Participants generally believed there would be a social 
interaction at the end of the study (M = 6.74, SD = 2.66, with 0 = I was absolutely 
convinced there would NOT be an interaction and 10 = I was absolutely convinced that 
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there would be an interaction).  This did not differ between SA Groups (p = .25) or 
Condition (p = .26), or the interaction of the two (p = .70).   
Thought Prompts During Attention Tasks. Participants reported that they 
generally did not think about the prompts during the attention tasks (M = 2.29, SD = 2.82, 
with 0 = I did not think about the prompts at all during the tasks and 10 = I thought of the 
prompts the entire time I completed the tasks).  This also did not differ between SA 
Groups (p = .89), Conditions (p = .28), or their interaction (p = .29).   
 Images and Words During Prompts.  Participants experienced mostly images 
(with some verbal content) during the manipulation (M = 2.09, SD = 1.29, with 1 = 
Almost all images, 3 = Half images/Half words, and 5 = Almost all words).  Those in the 
Distraction condition experienced almost entirely imagery (M = 1.05, SD = .23), whereas 
those in the Anticipation condition experienced more of a balance between images and 
words (M = 2.59, SD = 1.29; p < .001).  This is consistent with at least one previous study 
that has found the Distraction condition to be more imagery-laden than the Anticipation 
condition (Mills et al., 2014a).  The SA Groups experienced the same levels of imagery 
during the prompts (p = .75) and there was no significant SA Group X Condition 
interaction (p = .96).  
 Memory for Thinking Prompts.  Participants were tested on their ability to 
distinguish between thinking prompts they were administered versus those they were not.  
Out of the 18 prompts, participants generally were successful in remembering prompts 
that they viewed (M = 17.56, SD = .87), and there were no differences in SA Group (p = 
.44), Condition (p = .32), or the interaction of the two (p = .71).  
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 Strategy Use Questionnaire. For the Visual task, participants tended to use a mix 
of visual and verbal strategies to help them remember the location of the black cells (M = 
3.4, SD = 1.1), and this did not differ between SA Groups (p = .82) or Conditions (p = 
.09).  The interaction was not significant (p = .22).  They tended to rely mostly on verbal 
strategies for the Verbal task (M = 1.86, SD = .92). Again, there were no between group 








The purpose of the current study was to determine the potential effects of 
anticipatory processing (AP) on visual and verbal cognitive load task performance in a 
sample of high and low socially anxious individuals.  AP has been identified as a form of 
repetitive negative thinking that is potentially unique to socially-anxious individuals 
(Clark & Wells, 1995), but research only recently examined specific consequences of AP 
(e.g., Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003; Mills et al., 2014a; Mills et al., 2014b; Schulz et al., 
2008; Vassilopoulos, 2004; 2005b; Wong & Moulds, 2011; 2012).  The current study 
found that HSAs who engaged in AP prior to a threatened social task had more difficulty 
with the visual attention task, as evidenced by poorer scores compared to HSAs who 
engaged in the Distraction task and LSAs who also engaged in AP.  This suggests that the 
negative mental imagery associated with the AP task was difficult to ignore during the 
visual task.  This is somewhat consistent with a recent study that suggested socially 
anxious individuals actually have higher trait visual working memory capacity compared 
to nonanxious controls unless they are under a social threat, at which point their visual 
working memory capacity is lower than controls (Moriya & Sugiura, 2012).  Emerging 
research has emphasized the importance of imagery in social anxiety (Heimberg et al., 
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2010; Lang & McTeague, 2009; McTeague et al., 2009).  Specifically, social anxiety has 
been shown to be associated with intrusive negative self-images (Heimberg et al., 2010), 
and socially anxious individuals are more emotionally impacted by negative images than 
healthy individuals (McTeague et al., 2009).   
AP has been found to result in negative imagery (Vassilopoulos, 2005), but this 
study is the first to show that AP also interferes with visual working memory load.  
Impaired visual attention could be implicated as a maintenance factor for social anxiety 
symptoms.  Studies have found that individuals who hold negative images in their minds 
during social interactions have higher anxiety and lower ratings of their social 
performance than individuals not experiencing negative imagery (Hirsch, Clark, 
Mathews, & Williams, 2003; Hirsch, Meynen, & Clark, 2004).  Furthermore, and perhaps 
more importantly, while these individuals are experiencing negative imagery, they are 
perceived as more anxious and rated more negatively by objective assessors (Hirsch et 
al., 2003; Hirsch, et al., 2004), than individuals without negative imagery.  High anxiety, 
low self-ratings, and poor objective ratings likely converge to form a negative social 
experience, thereby reinforcing the individual’s social anxiety.  Therefore, this study 
suggests that AP maintains social anxiety symptoms by specifically impairing visual 
attentional load.  
AP did not influence verbal working memory load, suggesting that AP may not 
maintain social anxiety simply by increasing general cognitive load, but instead, the 
nature of the cognitive load is either restricted to visual material (Baddeley, 2012) and/or 
the visual material is particularly salient to HSAs (Cowan 1999; 2005) and therefore 
prioritized.  The lack of findings for the verbal task was surprising, as previous research 
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has found that rumination (Joorman et al., 2011) and worry (Rapee, 1993) interfere with 
verbal working memory.  However, these differences may be due to the unique role of 
imagery in AP and social anxiety compared to rumination and worry, which are heavily 
verbal processes.  Another possibility is that the visual load resulting from engaging in 
AP lasts longer than the verbal load, and therefore only the visual consequences of AP 
were present when participants were completing the cognitive tasks.  Joorman and 
colleagues (2011) demonstrated that depressed individuals had difficulty disengaging 
from negative verbal stimuli, suggesting that rumination may persist in depressed 
individuals once it begins.  We had similar expectations for AP, but it is possible that 
socially anxious individuals have more trouble disengaging from negative imagery 
compared to verbal content, and therefore only the imagery impacted their later task 
performance.  Further research could consider this, as well as determine the degree to 
which the Avoidance and Preparation components of AP are associated with imagery and 
verbal content.  
These results also significantly advance the literature on repetitive negative 
thinking, which has primarily focused on rumination and worry, and has recently trended 
toward conceptualizing all negative thought styles as unitary (McEvoy, Mahoney, & 
Moulds, 2010).  However, examining only worry and rumination and generalizing those 
results to a larger body of negative thought processes may lead to premature conclusions 
of transdiagnosticity, as worry and rumination are very similar verbal forms of repetitive 
negative thinking (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999).  AP, worry, and rumination have all 
shown different predictive capabilities when examined simultaneously with symptoms of 
psychopathology (Mills et al., 2014), and the current study demonstrates that AP seems to 
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have little effect on verbal working memory load, and may be better conceptualized as an 
imagery-based form of repetitive thought.  Various disorders have demonstrated different 
relationships with imagery (Lang & McTeague, 2009), and imagery content of repetitive 
negative thought processes may be one factor by which to differentiate disorders with 
high symptom overlap.  
The study was associated with some limitations that should be addressed.  The use 
of an undergraduate sample can limit the degree to which the results can be generalized 
to a clinical sample.  However, symptoms of social anxiety are conceptualized as 
dimensional (Ruscio, Brown, Chiu, & Kessler, 2008), social anxiety is common among 
college students (American College Health Association, 2009), and our mean S-SIAS 
scores for the HSA (37.6) group were similar to those in clinical samples of other studies 
(43.9; Rodebaugh et al., 2011).  Therefore, we believe our results provide important 
information about the nature of social anxiety despite the use of an undergraduate sample.  
The verbal and visual tasks originated from different studies, and therefore, 
results could not be directly compared.  Future studies may consider using tasks that have 
been normed to allow comparability.  However, because we found no differences in 
verbal task scores between groups or conditions, the inability to directly compare scores 
between tasks did not limit the results of the study.  
The current study advances the social anxiety, anticipatory processing, and 
repetitive negative thinking literatures significantly.  The imagery with AP appears to be 
particularly problematic for socially anxious individuals, as it was found to interfere with 
their visual attention.  The role of imagery is well-established in SAD, but if the negative 
imagery is generated as a result of engaging in AP, it is possible to develop treatment 
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protocols that help socially anxious individuals intervene with anticipation before it 
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Table 1.  
Demographic Data by SA Group & Condition 
 
HSA 
(N = 45) 
 
LSA 





(N = 45) 
Distract 




75.6% 73.3% 1.02 
 
73.3% 75.6% 1.20 
Sex (% male) 24.4% 24.4% 1.02  26.7% 22.2% 1.20 
Caucasian 68.9% 77.8% .91  68.9% 77.8% .91 
Non-
Caucasian 
31.1% 22.2% .91 
 
31.1% 22.2% .91 
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Trait Participant Characteristics by SA Group and Condition. 
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Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01. ASBQ assessed AP, ATTC assessed attentional control, 
CES-D assessed depression, CFQ assessed cognitive failures, E-PEPQ assessed 
postevent processing, GAD-7 assessed GAD, PSWQ assessed worry, RRS 
asssessed rumination, S-SIAS assessed social anxiety, T1 PANAS PA assessed 
state positive affect at Time 1, T1 PANAS NA assessed state negative affect at 



























































REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
 
Social Anxiety Disorder 
Social anxiety disorder (SAD) is a debilitating condition characterized by intense 
fear of negative evaluation in social interactions and/or performance situations (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2013).  In the United States, it is estimated that over 25 million 
individuals are affected by SAD (Kessler, Petukhova, Sampson, Zaslavsky, & Wittchen, 
2012).  SAD is associated with poor economic, interpersonal, educational, occupational, 
physical health, and mental health outcomes for the individual (e.g., Leon, Portera, & 
Weissman, 1995; Mogotsi, Kaminer, & Stein, 2000).  The wide array of negative 
consequences associated with SAD underscore the importance of research that examines 
factors implicated in the development and maintenance of symptoms.  
Multiple models of SAD have been proposed to explain these development and 
maintenance factors, including seminal cognitive-behavioral models (e.g., Clark, 2001; 
Clark & Wells, 1995; Heimberg, Brozovich, & Rapee, 2010; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) 
that have generated decades of empirical research.  These models stress the interaction of 
various cognitive processes, including attention, interpretation, memory, and repetitive 
negative thought (RNT) in the maintenance of social anxiety symptoms.   
These models generally suggest several ways in which individuals high in social anxiety  
58 
 
symptoms (HSAs) differ from those low in social anxiety symptoms (LSA) in 
information processing.  First, HSAs tend to believe that others have high standards to 
which HSAs are held, turning any social interaction into an important evaluative 
situation.  Therefore, as an interaction begins, HSAs become hypervigilant for threat 
information, including internal (i.e., physiological indices of anxiety; Clark & Wells, 
1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and external (i.e., negative facial expressions; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997) stimuli, which increases their awareness of these stimuli.  This biased 
attention is proposed to reduce resources and increase anxiety, perhaps resulting in actual 
social impairment.  These models also suggest that HSAs negatively interpret ambiguous 
social stimuli and have overly pessimistic beliefs about the probability and consequences 
of negative social events.  Their negative interpretations maintain their beliefs about their 
social inadequacy and therefore maintain their anxiety for future interactions (Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  
Attention.  Researchers have used several cognitive tasks in order to evaluate 
attentional processing in SAD.  For example, the emotional Stroop task (e.g., Williams, 
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996) instructs participants to name color words while ignoring 
the content of the word, and researchers have found that socially-anxious participants 
respond more slowly to social threat-related words (e.g., sweating; blushing) compared to 
neutral words (Grant & Beck, 2006; Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993), but nonanxious 
controls (Mattia et al., 1993) and participants with other anxiety disorders (Hope, Rapee, 
Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990) do not demonstrate this slower response.  Face-in-the-
crowd paradigms (e.g., Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999) have been used to 
examine participants’ ability to detect target faces among large numbers of distractor 
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stimuli, and have found HSAs (relative to LSAs) have enhanced ability to identify angry 
faces among neutral distractors, but difficulty ignoring emotional distractors when 
searching for a neutral face (Gilboa-Schechtman et al., 1999).   
Most recently, researchers have used variations of dot-probe tasks (MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986), which can provide information about initial orientation, 
disengagement, and avoidance of threat stimuli.  Typical dot-probe tasks present threat 
(e.g., a disgust or angry face) and neutral (e.g., a neutral face) stimuli simultaneously on 
either side of a screen, followed by a target probe (e.g., the letter “E”) behind one of the 
two stimuli.  Participants are instructed to respond to the target stimulus.  Studies have 
found that socially-anxious participants respond more quickly to the probe when it is 
preceded by a threat face compared to a neutral face (see Schultz & Heimberg, 2008).  
This faster response time is hypothesized to occur because HSAs are immediately drawn 
to the threatening face, so when the target probe appears behind it, they are already 
looking in that general area.  However, when the probe appears behind the neutral face, 
participants have to direct their attention to the other side of the screen, resulting in a 
longer response time (MacLeod et al., 1986).   
Studies using dot-probe methodology have generally suggested HSAs initially 
(e.g., within 300ms) experience biased attention toward threatening stimuli followed by 
avoidance after later latencies (e.g., after 500ms) (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Garner, Mogg, 
& Bradley, 2006; Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005a).  Several 
studies have suggested that initial vigilance to threat is followed by avoidance (e.g., 
Mogg et al., 2004; Vassilopoulos, 2005).  For example, Vassilopoulos (2005) had 
participants high and low in negative evaluation fear complete a modified dot-probe task 
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with social threat (e.g., “foolish,” “incompetent,” “weird,”) and neutral (e.g., “north,” 
“expensive,” “green,”) words.  A pair of words (one neutral and one threat) was 
presented for either 200ms or 500ms and were then replaced by a probe that required a 
response from the participant.  Participants high in evaluation fear demonstrated an 
attention bias toward threat words when they were presented for 200ms, but at 500ms 
they were biased away from threat words, suggesting avoidance.  Although additional 
studies also support the vigilance-avoidance hypothesis (e.g., Mogg et al., 2004; Garner 
et al., 2006), Judah and colleagues (Judah, Grant, Lechner, & Mills, 2013) found that 
under high working memory load, HSAs demonstrate difficulty disengaging attention 
from threat instead of avoidance.  This study underscored the importance of continuing to 
examine moderators of attention biases.  
Additional moderators of attention bias were demonstrated by studies attempting 
to determine whether HSAs were predominately biased toward internal (e.g., 
physiological) or external (e.g., faces) stimuli.  Four studies (Deiters, Stevens, Hermann, 
& Gerlach, 2013; Mansell, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; Mills, Grant, Judah & White, 2014; 
Pineles & Mineka, 2005) examined internal and external attention biases simultaneously 
using varying stimulus modalities (i.e., images, tactile feedback, live interactions).  In 
each study, results suggested that HSAs only demonstrated internal attention biases under 
conditions of social threat, suggesting that these biases are activated by anxiety related to 
an upcoming social task.  Biases were not observed for external stimuli.  
This research has demonstrated importance in SAD, as attention biases have been 
proposed to be a causal mechanism in the maintenance of social anxiety (Van Bockstaele 
et al., 2014) and treatment efforts aimed at cognitive bias modification have shown 
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promise (Beard, Weisberg, & Amir, 2011).  Taken together, the attention literature has 
been advanced by research efforts devoted to identifying moderators of attention biases 
(e.g., Cisler & Koster, 2010; Schultz & Heimberg, 2008).  Trait anxiety level, stimulus 
presentation time, stimulus type, and working memory load have all been identified as 
influential moderators and have increased researchers’ understanding of attentional 
processes in social anxiety.  However, reviews of attention bias still report equivocal 
results (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Schultz & Heimberg, 2008), suggesting that more 
research is needed on the interaction of attentional processes.  
Interpretations.  Research on interpretation biases have generally found that 
HSAs interpret ambiguous social information as negative (Amir & Bomyea, 2010).  
Interpretation biases are specific to social stimuli (Amir et al., 1998) and have been found 
using event-related brain potentials (Moser, Hajcak, Huppert, Foa, & Simons, 2008), 
reaction time on cognitive tasks (Amir, Prouvost, & Kuckertz, 2012), self-report 
(Huppert, Pasupuleti, Foa, & Mathews, 2007; Mills, Grant, Judah, & Lechner, 2014; 
Stopa & Clark, 2000), and behavioral interactions (Kanai, Sasagawa, Chen, Shimada, & 
Sakano, 2010).  For example, Kanai and colleagues (2010) had confederates engage in 
common and neutral behaviors (e.g., scratching head, clearing throat) during a social 
interaction with participants high and low in social anxiety symptoms.  As expected, 
HSAs rated those behaviors more negatively than control participants.  However, the 
research is mixed in terms of the nature of these biases.  For example, some studies 
suggest SAD is characterized by the tendency for HSAs to endorse negative 
interpretations (Huppert et al., 2007; Kanai et al., 2010; Mills et al., 2014a; Stopa & 
Clark, 2000), whereas others have found that HSAs do not disproportionately endorse 
62 
 
negative interpretations, but instead are less likely than nonanxious individuals to endorse 
positive interpretations (Amir et al., 2012; Hirsch & Mathews, 2008; Moser et al., 2008).   
It also is likely that interpretations may be a function of attention bias.  Mills and 
colleagues (2014a) found that HSAs who were more focused on internal stimuli also 
were more likely to endorse negative interpretations.   This is consistent with Clark and 
Wells (1995), who suggested that self-focused attention increases anxiety and reduces 
attention on the interaction, leaving the socially anxious individual with ambiguous 
information to evaluate while in a state of increased anxiety.   
Memory.   Cognitive models also proposed that HSAs would disproportionately 
remember negative social stimuli relative to neutral or positive stimuli.  However, results 
have been inconclusive to date (Amir & Bomyea, 2010; Coles & Heimberg, 2002; Foa, 
Gilboa-Schechtman, Amir, & Freshman, 2000; Mitte, 2008; Morgan, 2010; Rapee, 
McCallum, Melville, Ravenscroft, & Rodney, 1994).  Rapee and colleagues (1994) 
examined recall and recognition memory performance between HSAs and LSAs using 
words, personal memories, and negative feedback and failed to find differences between 
HSAs and LSAs.  However, Foa and colleagues (2000) found that HSAs had better 
memory (recall and recognition) of facial expressions than LSAs, and this effect was 
enhanced for negative faces.   
Several review articles have attempted to summarize the memory literature in 
order to explain inconsistent results.  Coles and Heimberg (2002) suggested that there 
was little evidence to support that HSAs have a bias for explicit (i.e. conscious) 
memories, but some evidence suggests that implicit biases exist.  However, a meta-
analysis by Mitte (2008) suggested that there was little overall evidence across anxiety 
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disorders that anxiety is associated with an implicit memory bias.  Mitte (2008) suggested 
that recognition memory bias for threat stimuli is more consistently demonstrated with 
threat images than threat words, and those high in anxiety tended to explicitly recall more 
threat-related information than nonanxious individuals.  Mitte (2008) described these 
contradictory findings in terms of methodological differences and emphasized the 
importance of using more consistent and valid methodology.  
Morgan (2010) suggested that examining memory biases for lists of threatening 
words or emotional faces lacks ecological validity, which may contribute to inconsistent 
findings.  Instead, she suggested research examining autobiographical memories, which 
are complex, self-relevant episodic memories.  HSAs are hypothesized to retain 
autobiographical memories of past social failures that intrusively arise under conditions 
of social threat.  Therefore, autobiographical memories are an appropriate but infrequent 
target of research.  For example, D’Argembeau and colleagues (2006) asked HSAs to 
recall social and non-social memories and found that social memories were characterized 
by increased internal/self-referential details and fewer external sensory (e.g., visual, 
auditory) details, which is similar to results in the attention literature about internal and 
external attention biases (e.g., Deiters et al., 2013; Mansell et al., 2003; Mills et al., 
2014b; Pineles & Mineka, 2005).  Overall, Mitte (2010) concluded that the extant 
research on autobiographical memories has found that HSAs experience 
disproportionately enhanced memory for negative emotional autobiographical material, 
thus proposing that memory research should continue examining autobiographical 
memories.   However, since that review was published, research on autobiographical 
memories in SAD remains limited.  One promising study compared a group of 
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participants diagnosed with SAD to a control group and found that both experience 
negative autobiographical memories under social threat.  However, SAD patients 
retrieved a higher proportion of negative memories than controls, and positive memories 
recalled by SAD patients had significantly fewer details than those of controls 
(Moscovitch, Gavric, Merrifield, Bielak, & Moscovich, 2011).  Furthermore, these 
memories resulted in more negative affective and cognitive consequences for SAD 
participants relative to controls.  
Together, many studies have demonstrated memory bias for threat in SAD, but 
several other studies have failed to demonstrate a bias (Amir & Bomyea, 2010).  It is 
possible that increased research on autobiographical memory can improve consistency of 
these results; however, researchers also should consider including potential interactive 
processes (e.g., information processing biases and RNT) into this literature in order to 
assist in the explanation of equivocal results.  
Integration.  Despite decades of promising findings in clinical research, only 
recently have researchers begun to examine the interaction among cognitive processes 
(Hirsch Clark, & Mathews, 2006).  The limited body of literature has suggested that 
cognitive processes interact in depression (e.g., Everaert, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012) 
and social anxiety (Hirsch et al., 2006; Mills, Grant, Judah, & Lechner, 2014).  As 
individual cognitive processes do not occur in isolation, this line of literature is vital to 
understanding the role of cognition in symptoms of psychopathology, including SAD.   
The integration of these components is described in cognitive models, but remains 
generally untested.  Hirsch and colleagues (2006) reviewed attention and interpretation 
research and proposed a combined cognitive bias model.  Under social threat, HSAs 
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experience negative memories and imagery (Moscovitch et al., 2011; Heimberg et al., 
2010), and the processing of negative self-imagery (and increase in self-focused 
attention; Mills et al., 2014b) prevents the generation of positive interpretations (Hirsch, 
Clark, Mathews, & Williams, 2003) that nonanxious individuals typically experience.  
With few resources to devote to the interaction and the inability to generate positive 
interpretations, HSAs are unable to gather evidence that contradicts their negative beliefs, 
resulting in the maintenance of social anxiety in evaluative situations.  The maladaptive 
cycle will continue at the next social interaction, because HSAs under social threat 
demonstrate self-focused attention (Deiters et al., 2013; Mansell et al., 2003; Mills et al., 
2014a; 2014b; Pineles & Mineka, 2005), which promotes negative self-imagery (Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Hirsch et al., 2006).   
The promising results of studies that have evaluated combined cognitive models 
have emphasized the need to continue examining how cognitive processes influence each 
other.  Therefore, the purpose of this study was to add to the limited but growing body of 
literature that examines the integration of multiple cognitive processes that are 
independently hypothesized to maintain social anxiety symptoms.  This was done by 
examining the relationship between anticipatory processing and working memory.  
Working memory has been a recent target of psychopathology researchers, as it can 
explain mechanisms associated with symptom maintenance.  Anticipatory processing is 
an anxious form of RNT proposed by Clark and Wells (1995) that has been rarely studied 




 Anxiety researchers have shown growing interest in working memory, which is 
responsible for the short-term storage and manipulation of information (e.g., Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974) and acts as a bridge between perception and long-term memory (Baddeley, 
2003).  Several models of working memory have been proposed in the cognitive 
literature.  Some models (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1974) describe the function and 
integration of various subsystems of working memory, whereas others (e.g. Cowan, 
1999) are concerned with general characteristics and functions of the working memory 
system.    
Baddeley & Hitch.  Baddeley and Hitch (1974) provided a significant 
advancement in theories of information processing with their model of working memory, 
which differed from existing theories by describing multiple components and functions of 
the short-term memory (STM) system (Baddeley, 2003).  The most significant addition to 
existing models was the description of the interaction between several components within 
the working memory system.  Their working memory model consists of two storage 
systems, the phonological loop and visuospatial sketchpad, and a control system called 
the central executive.  These systems interact in order to process incoming perceptual 
stimuli, to rehearse and manipulate information, and to encode information into long-
term memory (LTM) for future retrieval.  
Phonological Loop.  The phonological loop includes a component for short-term 
echoic memory storage and a component that is responsible for articulatory rehearsal 
(e.g., subvocal speech).  Specifically, the storage system holds fast-decaying auditory 
information while the articulatory system rehearses this information in a loop in order to 
prevent decay.  This system is responsible for processing and storage of verbal material, 
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and has been proposed to be a mechanism that evolved in order to acquire language 
(Baddeley, 2003).  Therefore, the phonological loop is believed to be responsible for 
verbal working memory capacity, and research supports that phonological task 
performance is impaired upon the introduction of concurrent verbal information 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).   
The phonological loop was originally proposed to be completely distinct from 
LTM, as Baddeley and Hitch (1974) described individuals with phonological 
impairments but sufficient LTM.  However, follow-up research suggested that 
phonological difficulties are associated with impaired language acquisition and lower 
vocabulary (Baddeley, Papagno, & Vallar, 1988).  This suggests some independence of 
the phonological subsystem from long-term functioning, but these processes also appear 
related.   
Several characteristics of verbal short term memory are supported by the theory of 
the phonological loop.  Intuitively, longer words or longer lists of words are harder to 
remember than shorter words or lists (Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975).  Lists of 
similar stimuli (e.g., c, g, d, e) are more difficult to remember than distinct stimuli (e.g., 
x, t, y, f) (Baddeley, 1966).  Finally, engaging in concurrent verbal tasks (e.g., articulatory 
suppression), such as repeating a word or number, interferes with verbal memory 
performance (Baddeley et al., 1975) and prevents coding visual information verbally 
(Murray, 1968).  Thus, the phonological loop, as with working memory and short-term 
memory in general, is a system of limited capacity.  For example, Richardson and 
Baddeley (1975) had participants memorize lists of 16 words each while repeating “hi-
ya” out loud or remaining silent, and found decreased recall performance in the speaking 
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condition, demonstrating that articulatory suppression results in interference in the 
phonological loop.   
Visuospatial Sketchpad.  As the phonological loop is responsible for verbal 
working memory, the visuospatial sketchpad is a limited-capacity system responsible for 
visual working memory, including shapes, spatial locations, and colors.  Research has 
demonstrated that introducing a concurrent visuospatial task can interfere with recall for 
visuospatial but not verbal information, supporting the dissociation between these two 
systems.  For example, Sims and Hegarty (1997) had participants engage in a visuospatial 
task that involved examining images of a pulley system and deciding whether the 
diagram was showing the correct direction of motion.  They also engaged in secondary 
visuospatial and verbal tasks, and more interference occurred on the visual compared to 
the verbal task.  
Although less studied than the phonological loop (Baddeley, 2012), evidence 
suggests that the visuospatial sketchpad includes at least two distinct nonverbal 
components (spatial and visual STM), as well as potentially kinesthetic and tactile 
components (Baddeley, 2012).  Hecker and Mapperson (1997) had participants complete 
spatial sequence and color matching tasks under conditions of spatial and color 
interference, and found that only spatial interference impaired spatial task performance, 
whereas only color interference impaired color matching performance.   Many other 
studies have replicated this distinction (see Klauer & Zhao, 2004 for a review).  
 Central Executive.  The central executive is the control system of working 
memory that is involved with focusing, shifting, and dividing attention. It also is thought 
to be responsible for orchestrating (and switching between) storage and retrieval 
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processes (Baddeley, 2003; 2012; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).  Baddeley (2003) describes 
this system as the “most important but least understood component of working memory” 
(p. 835).  The central executive is thought to be responsible for several attentional 
functions, including shifting (e.g., shifting among multiple tasks), inhibition (e.g., 
inhibiting automatic responses), and updating (e.g., monitoring and updating 
representations in working memory; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 
2000; Smith & Jonides, 1999).  Miyake and colleagues (2000) demonstrated support for 
these three functions of the central executive by performing a confirmatory factor 
analysis on several commonly used tasks of executive functioning.  Their three-factor 
model demonstrated excellent fit.  These three components were moderately correlated 
(rs ranged from .42 to .63) but distinct from each other.  They also noted that they only 
examined three basic functions of the central executive that have been proposed in 
previous research, and central executive functioning is likely not limited to these three 
functions.   They suggested that more complex functions, such as planning and engaging 
in multiple tasks simultaneously could be studied as combinations of the three basic 
functions.   
 Because the central executive has been linked to performance in many domains, 
difficulties in executive functioning have been linked to almost every form of 
psychopathology, including attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (Alderson et al., 
2010; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996; Poletti, 2009), autism spectrum disorder (Pennington 
& Ozonoff, 1996), depression (Poletti, 2009), anxiety (Hosenbocus & Chahal, 2012), and 
schizophrenia (Hosenbocus & Chahal, 2012).  Executive functioning deficits also have 
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been found in various medical patients, including chronic pain (Nes, Roach, & 
Segerstrom, 2009), epilepsy (Braakman et al., 2011).  
 Studies have attempted to examine the relationship between the central executive 
and the verbal and visual subsystems.  Miyake and colleagues (2001) suggested that 
visuospatial working memory and STM tasks place equal demands on the central 
executive, making them difficult to distinguish from each other, which is in direct 
contrast to studies that have found differences between verbal STM and verbal working 
memory tasks (e.g., Engle. Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999).  Studies such as these 
demonstrated the limits of the original description of the central executive system and 
prompted further research, which resulted in the addition of the episodic buffer to 
Baddeley’s model.  
 Episodic Buffer.  The description of the central executive in the Baddeley and 
Hitch (1974) model was specific to attention and did not account for the transfer of 
information from STM to LTM (Baddeley, 2003).  Additionally, the central executive 
was assumed to have no storage capacity, which did not explain how the slave systems 
integrated with each other and/or the central executive (Baddeley, 2012).  Therefore, 
Baddeley (2000) added a new component to the model called the episodic buffer, which 
is another limited-capacity storage system that integrates information from various 
domains simultaneously.  Thus, the episodic buffer serves as an integrative storage 
system for the phonological loop, visuospatial sketchpad, central executive, and LTM 
(Baddeley, 2000; 2003).  Baddeley (2003; 2012) suggests that the episodic buffer could 
be conceptualized as a storage component of the central executive system, whereas the 
original description of the central executive (i.e., focusing, shifting, dividing attention) is 
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primarily responsible for attentional awareness and attentional processes.  Baddeley and 
colleagues (2011) suggest that the episodic buffer serves passively (e.g., unconsciously) 
as the “heart” (p. 1399) of the working memory system, in order to integrate multimodal 
sensory information into LTM.   
Cognitive and neurological research has generally found support for the proposed 
function and integration between these subsystems (e.g., Baddeley, 2003; 2012).  For 
example, research has suggested that attaching verbal labels to visual stimuli enhances 
recall of the visual stimuli (Brown, Forbes, & McConnell, 2006; Verhaegen, Palfai, & 
Johnson, 2006).  In order to identify the mechanisms responsible for this enhancement, 
Wesley and Brown (2013) examined the role of the phonological loop and central 
executive in the enhancement of visuospatial working memory performance.  Participants 
completed a modified version of the Visual Patterns Task (VPT; Brown et al., 2006), 
which asks participants to reproduce grids of black and white squares after a 10 second 
delay.  Some grids were designed such that the black cells appeared like common shapes 
(e.g., square) or letters, so participants could recruit verbal resources in order to 
remember the pattern (high verbal).  Other grids formed abstract patterns that could not 
benefit from the use of verbal strategies (low verbal).  Articulatory suppression did not 
interact with the type of grid, suggesting that taxing the phonological loop did not impair 
performance on the task.  Therefore, the phonological loop may not be involved in the 
enhancement of visual memory when using verbal strategies.  However, taxing the 
central executive did prevent participants from benefitting from verbal strategies, 
suggesting that the resources of the central executive assist in multimodal (e.g., verbal 
and visual) encoding.  
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 Cowan’s Embedded Processes Model.  An alternate, but not incompatible 
(Baddeley, 2003) approach to working memory was provided by Cowan (1999; 2005).  
This model is seemingly more focused on what occurs in the systems that Baddeley 
called the central executive and episodic buffer.  In other words, this model is less 
concerned with specific domains of the working memory system, but instead is more 
focused on describing the nature of awareness and capacity.  The principles of Cowan’s 
model suggest that 1) working memory consists of a hierarchy of information that 
includes LTM, currently-activated LTM, and the subset of currently-activated LTM that 
is under attentional focus at any given moment; 2) attention is limited by capacity and 
awareness is limited by time; 3) attentional focus is controlled by both voluntary (i.e., 
central executive) and involuntary (i.e., attentional orienting) processes; 4) orientation to 
stimuli can be habituated; and 5) increased awareness results in increased encoding of 
information and therefore increased recall.  
 Levels of Activation.  Cowan (1999) suggested that memory is organized 
hierarchically in terms of three levels of activation.  Long-term storage is the largest 
process in this model, as it consists of seemingly infinite storage, but the majority of it 
remains inactive.  At any given time, a subset of our long-term store can be activated into 
short-term memory.  This subset is called the activated memory, and Cowan argues that 
Baddeley’s visuospatial sketchpad and phonological loop are two of several domains of 
activated memory.  Within activated memory is a narrower subset of activation that 
Cowan described as our focus of attention and awareness.  This latter process is the 
information of which we are consciously aware at any given moment, and Cowan 
suggests that this system is limited in capacity to only a few items at a time.  Cowan 
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(1999) also noted that effort can be directed away from specific information instead of 
toward it, which is referred to as inhibition. While attention is consciously focused on a 
narrow subset of stimuli, automatic processes continue to simultaneously run in the 
background in order to efficiently recruit attention for highly noticeable events, such as 
personally-relevant (e.g., your name being spoken) or salient sensory (e.g., loud noises or 
bright lights) information.   
Cowan’s research also has suggested that the conscious focus of attention has a 
capacity of approximately four chunks of information (Cowan, 2005) challenging the 
longstanding acceptance of Miller’s ‘magical number’ of seven (Miller, 1956).  Cowan 
and other researchers (e.g., Oberauer and Bialkova, 2009) are therefore suggesting that 
attentional focus is much more limited than previously thought, and may be limited to as 
few as one or two chunks (Oberauer & Bialkova, 2009).  
Bell and colleagues (2012) tested aspects of Cowan’s model by presenting verbal 
auditory distractions to participants during number recall tasks.  Cowan’s model suggests 
that these distractions serve as novel stimuli that should pull the focus of attention away 
from the task, but as the distractions are repeated and lose novelty, individuals should be 
able to maintain focus of attention on the serial recall task.  This is precisely what Bell 
and colleagues (2012) found in a series of five experiments.   Participants experienced 
initial interference in recall performance that attenuated over time, suggesting that the 
orienting response described by Cowan (1999) attenuated after habituation.  However, if 
distractor stimuli were varied in any way during the task, the orienting response re-
emerged.  Similarly, distractor stimuli that are relevant to the individual have been found 
to be more distracting than irrelevant stimuli (Bell, Mund, & Buchner, 2011).  
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Additional research evaluating specific predictions of the Embedded Processes 
Model is limited.  Chein and colleagues (2003) suggest that this model may map onto 
verbal-linguistic processing neuroimaging data more accurately than Baddeley’s model 
(Chein, Ravizza, & Fiez, 2003).  However, this study is currently one of the only 
available studies to compare the two models by examining existing empirical results.   
Anxiety and Attention – Attentional Control Theory 
 Researchers have frequently examined the effects of anxiety on attentional 
processes.  Eysenck and colleagues (2007) provided a framework for studying this 
interaction by proposing predictions about how anxiety could influence three major 
functions of the central executive: inhibition, shifting, and updating (e.g., Miyake et al., 
2000).  This framework was called Attentional Control Theory.  
Eyesenck and colleagues (2007) identified a distinction between performance 
effectiveness, which is concerned with accuracy, and processing efficiency, which is 
concerned with the interaction between accuracy and the amount of effort needed for task 
performance.  When challenged with concurrent tasks or limited resources, individuals 
can increase their effort to maintain performance effectiveness; therefore, concurrent 
tasks are likely to impair efficiency but not necessarily effectiveness.  They also describe 
how anxiety can impair attentional control, which is one’s ability to consciously direct 
attentional processes, by inhibiting certain information processing functions of the central 
executive (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007).  Specifically, the introduction of 
anxiety into the environment enhances stimulus-driven attention (e.g., bottom-up 
processing; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) in order to improve vigilance to threat.  This 
utilizes attentional resources, thus reducing the individuals’ ability to engage in goal-
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directed (e.g., top-down; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002) executive processes, such as being 
able to consciously inhibit task-irrelevant stimuli.  To compensate for this, more 
resources are recruited in order to maintain performance effectiveness, and this increase 
in effort results in the maintenance of observable performance.  The lack of noticeable 
differences in performance may lead to conclusions that anxiety is not influencing 
attentional processes, but the increase of cognitive resources that is necessary in order to 
maintain performance has been found to be influential (Eysenck et al., 2007).   
Research has supported that anxiety impairs processing efficiency but not 
effectiveness (e.g., Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker, & Eysenck, 2009).  This theory 
has been tested using an antisaccade task, which is a measure of inhibition.  Derakshan 
and colleagues (2009) instructed participants high and low in trait anxiety to direct 
attention toward (prosaccade) and away (antisaccade) from a prepotent stimulus, the 
latter of which is difficult considering the reflexive tendency to orient to novel stimuli.  
As predicted by attentional control theory, there were no differences in the number of 
errors made by participants high and low in anxiety.  Because the antisaccade task is 
more difficult than a prosaccade task, all participants took longer to correctly look away 
from the stimulus during the antisaccade task.  However, highly-anxious participants 
demonstrated longer response times than control participants, suggesting increased effort 
and reduced efficiency, especially during the presentation of negative emotional stimuli 
(angry faces; Study 2), supporting several predictions of attentional control theory.  
Using a similar saccade task, Ansari and colleagues (2008) examined the effects 
of anxiety on attentional shifting.  A fixation cross was followed by a stimulus on one 
side of the screen, and participants were instructed to look toward or away from the 
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stimulus.  They also completed blocks with mixed instructions, during which the color of 
the fixation cross indicated whether participants were to look toward or away from the 
stimulus.  During the mixed block, a trial was defined as a “shifting” trial if it had 
different instructions than the previous trial.  They found that low anxious participants 
had faster reaction times during mixed trials because they were receiving reminders of 
the task instructions during each trial, as indicated by the color of the fixation cross.  
However, high anxious participants did not experience this improvement.  They 
suggested that switching requires attentional resources and efficient top-down processing, 
and while low-anxiety participants were able to benefit from the task cue at every trial, 
high-anxiety participants’ difficulty with efficient top-down processing prevented the 
same facilitated processing that low-anxiety participants experienced.  
 Finally, attentional control theory proposed that anxiety interferes with updating 
and monitoring mental representations.  Behavioral research examining the effects of 
anxiety on updating have been equivocal (Berggren & Derakshan, 2013; Eysenck et al., 
2007), but updating does not require attentional control, and therefore the effects of 
anxiety on updating are hypothesized to be more limited compared to inhibition and 
shifting (Eysenck et al., 2007).  However, some impairment in updating is expected due 
to stress making significant demands on the central executive overall (Eysenck et al., 
2007).   
In a review of attentional control theory, Berggren and Derakshan (2013) 
concluded that the literature supports the main hypotheses regarding the effect of anxiety 
on attentional control.  They also suggested that research supports that anxious 
individuals can compensate for the effects of anxiety by recruiting additional resources; 
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however, they noted influential moderators that can interfere with this compensatory 
behavior, including motivation and cognitive load.  Specifically, anxious participants 
with low motivation demonstrate efficiency deficits predicted by attentional control 
theory, but with sufficient motivation, those deficits appear to attenuate (Hayes, 
MacLeod, & Hammond, 2009).  Anxious participants under cognitive load (e.g., 
engaging in a concurrent counting task) demonstrated slower visual search and increased 
fixation on distracting stimuli, neither of which were experienced by low-anxious 
participants under cognitive load (Berggren, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012).  This suggests 
that cognitive load may be disproportionately disruptive to high-anxious individuals’ 
ability to engage in attentional control compared to low-anxious individuals.  
 Effects of Social Anxiety on Attentional Control.  The extent to which these 
results generalize to social anxiety has been tested in only six available studies.  Judah 
and colleagues (Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2013a) used event-related potentials to 
examine processing efficiency in shifting and inhibition with participants high (HSA) and 
low (LSA) in social anxiety symptoms.  This was done with a mixed antisaccade task that 
included a threat manipulation on 20% of the trials using false heart rate feedback.  HSAs 
demonstrated longer saccade onset and greater amplitudes of the CNV negativity for both 
shifting and inhibition trials, which indicated an increased recruitment of effort.  For 
social threat inhibition trials, HSAs had delayed onset of the P3b component, suggesting 
a delay in their ability to categorize stimuli.  They also had reduced P3b amplitude 
throughout the entire task, suggesting that they had fewer resources with which to engage 
in stimulus categorization.  Taken together, these results supported aspects of attentional 
control theory and cognitive theories of social anxiety, as HSAs demonstrated a reduction 
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of attentional resources and increased interference under social threat.  Wieser and 
colleagues (2009) found that HSAs demonstrated difficulty with antisaccade tasks, but 
not prosaccade tasks, with emotional face stimuli, suggesting that the presence of 
threatening faces impaired HSAs’ inhibition ability.  
 Amir and Bomyea (2011) found that nonanxious participants demonstrated better 
working memory control than participants with SAD with neutral stimuli, suggesting that 
attentional control is impaired in those with anxiety.  They suggested that this difference 
may be the result of SAD participants engaging in concurrent tasks, such as RNT 
processes, throughout the study.  However, there was no difference between groups on 
performance with social threat stimuli, and SAD patients demonstrated enhanced 
working memory performance for social words compared to neutral words, suggesting 
that processing of salient threat words is more automatic for those with symptoms of 
SAD than it is for nonanxious individuals.  
 Other studies have found that attentional control 1) is negatively associated with 
social anxiety, even after controlling for trait anxiety and depression (Moriya & Tanno, 
2008), 2)  longitudinally mediates the relationship between social anxiety symptoms and 
positive affect (Morrison & Heimberg, 2013) and 3) improves after cognitive behavioral 
treatment for social anxiety (Bowler et al., 2012).  Thus, the important tenets of 
attentional control theory, including decreased efficiency and difficulties with inhibition 
and shifting, likely generalize to social anxiety as well.  
Anticipatory Processing 
 Clark and Wells (1995) proposed a model of SAD that described cognitive 
processes that interact to maintain symptoms.  Specifically, they noted that HSAs engage 
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in a process of RNT prior to a social interaction that they called anticipatory processing.  
During anticipatory processing, HSAs imagine past social failures, generate worst-case 
predictions about the upcoming interaction, think of ways to escape or avoid the 
upcoming interaction, and imagine their appearance from a third-person perspective 
(Clark & Wells, 1995; Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003).  Clark and Wells (1995) suggest that 
anticipatory processing results in a shift of attention inward, and as such, HSAs have 
reduced attention to their interaction partner and likely do not notice any information that 
could disconfirm their negative hypotheses (e.g., signs of acceptance from others).  HSAs 
are left with ambiguous information with which to evaluate the quality of the social 
interaction and will default to a negative interpretation, leaving them with an additional 
piece of evidence in favor of their social ineptitude.   
 Some aspects of Clark and Wells’ (1995) model have been tested thoroughly 
(e.g., attention, as discussed above), but currently, only about fifteen studies have 
examined anticipatory processing.  Hinrichsen and Clark (2003) identified several 
specific cognitions that discriminate HSAs from LSAs and used those to construct the 
Anticipatory Social Behaviours Questionnaire (ASBQ).  They also instructed HSAs and 
LSAs to engage in anticipatory processing or a distraction task for twenty minutes prior 
to an upcoming speech task.  Those who engaged in anticipation, regardless of social 
anxiety status, had higher self-reported anxiety during a speech task, suggesting that 
anticipatory processing heightened and maintained state anxiety related to a social task.  
Anticipatory processing has been found to be negative, distracting, and intrusive 
(Vassilopoulos, 2004).  Five studies have found that it increases self-reported and 
physiological indices of anxiety (Vassilopoulos, 2004; 2005a; Schulz, Alpers, & 
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Hofmann, 2008; Wong & Moulds, 2011; 2012), and three have found that it results in 
negative beliefs and interpretations (Mills et al., 2014a; Wong & Moulds, 2011; 2012), as 
well as increases in self-focused attention (Mills et al., 2014a; Mills et al., 2014b), 
imagery (Vassilopoulos, 2005a), and prolongs the experience of rumination (Grant & 
Beck, 2010).   
Anticipatory Processing and Physiological Responding.  It is important to 
examine the effects of anticipatory processing on psychophysiology, because physiology 
is particularly important in SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995) and physiological arousal can 
serve as an indicator of cognitive activity (Muth, Moss, Rosopa, Salley, & Walker, 2012) 
and anxiety (Schulz et al., 2008).  Only two studies have evaluated physiological 
responding during anticipatory processing, despite the potential importance of physiology 
in social anxiety disorder.  Schulz and colleagues (2008) found that HSAs who engaged 
in anticipatory processing prior to a speech task experienced significantly decreased 
respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) compared to those who engaged in a relaxation task.  
This suggests that HSAs have significant difficulty engaging in parasympathetic 
regulation and are physiologically inflexible (e.g., Porges, 2007) during anticipatory 
processing.  They did not observe any significant associations between social anxiety 
symptoms, anticipatory processing, and skin conductance, which is a measure of 
sympathetic activation.  However, in a similar study, Wong and Moulds (2011) found 
that those who engaged in anticipatory processing had higher skin conductance than those 
who engaged in a distraction task, suggesting that anticipatory processing did increase 
sympathetic activation for all participants regardless of social anxiety status.  These two 
studies have provided promising results, but this research is limited and will benefit from 
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additional studies examining the relationship between anticipatory processing and 
physiological responding.  Research on psychophysiological responding to fearful images 
has suggested that SAD falls in the middle of the anxiety disorder spectrum, which is 
characterized by acute, fear-related disorders (e.g., specific phobia) on one end and 
chronic, general-distress related disorders (e.g., generalized anxiety disorder, 
posttraumatic stress disorder) on the other (Lang & McTeague, 2009; McTeague & Lang, 
2012; McTeague et al., 2009).  Therefore, an added benefit of examining physiology 
during anticipatory processing can be to provide information about the degree of imagery 
that may be present during anticipation.  
Potential Functions of Anticipatory Processing.  A psychometric study found 
that anticipatory processing may consist of both preparatory (e.g., rehearsing 
conversations, thinking about everything that could happen) and avoidance-based (e.g., 
planning how to escape or avoid the interaction, thought suppression) cognitions, with 
only the latter predicting negative outcomes in socially-anxious individuals (Mills, Grant, 
Lecher, & Judah, 2013).  Using these subscales, Mills, Grant, Lechner and Judah (2014) 
examined the simultaneous roles of worry, rumination (and its subscales), and 
anticipatory processing in the prediction of symptoms of social anxiety, generalized 
anxiety disorder, and depressive symptoms.  They consistently found that avoidance-
related anticipatory processing predicted social anxiety symptoms above and beyond the 
effects of worry and rumination.  Together, both studies (Mills et al., 2013; Mills, Grant, 
Lechner, & Judah, 2014) underscored the importance of research attempting to evaluate 
the functions anticipatory processing.  
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Anticipatory Processing and Clark and Wells (1995).  Although interesting, 
few of these studies tested Clark and Well’s (1995) hypothesis that anticipatory 
processing influenced other cognitive components of their model (i.e., attention and 
interpretation).  Mills and colleagues (2014a) used a methodology similar to Hinrichsen 
and Clark (2003) in order to address this gap.  HSAs and LSAs engaged in either an 
anticipatory processing (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003) or distraction (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1993) task and assessed the effects of anticipatory processing on self-focused 
attention and negative interpretations.  They found that HSAs who engaged in 
anticipatory processing reported higher levels of self-focus (e.g., focusing on the sound of 
one’s voice, physiology, thoughts, anxiety, etc.) than any other group, suggesting that 
anticipatory processing indeed enhanced self-focused attention as Clark and Wells (1995) 
suggested.  Anticipatory processing also resulted in higher endorsement of negative 
interpretations regardless of social anxiety group, and self-focused attention mediated this 
relationship for HSAs.  Therefore, the direct link between anticipatory processing and 
self-focused attention has been found, but methods other than self-report are needed in 
order to better understand the relationship.  
Mills, Grant, Judah, and White (2014) conducted a follow-up study that examined 
the effect of anticipatory processing on attentional bias for internal threat information.  
This study was based on the methodology of Pineles and Mineka (2005), in which HSAs 
and LSAs engaged in a modified dot-probe task prior to a social threat or control task.  
External stimuli consisted of emotional faces, as with prior attention bias studies, and 
internal stimuli included threat (heart wave) and neutral (sound wave) images.  Mills and 
colleagues (2014b) had participants engage in a baseline attention task followed by an 
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anticipatory processing or distraction manipulation.  Participants then completed a second 
attention task.  Prior to anticipatory processing, HSAs’ bias score did not differ from 
zero; however, after anticipatory processing, they were significantly biased toward the 
heart rate stimuli.  Therefore, results suggested that HSAs who engaged in anticipation 
experienced an increase in attention bias score for internal information.  As with similar 
studies (Deiters et al., 2013; Mansell et al., 2003; Pineles & Mineka, 2005), attention bias 
was not observed under the control condition.  
This study provided further elaboration of the influence of anticipatory processing 
on attention.  It suggested that anticipatory processing prior to a social interaction may 
activate biases for internal threat information, which as Clark and Wells (1995) suggest, 
may prevent individuals from noticing external information.  However, the mechanisms 
responsible for the relationship between anticipatory processing and attention biases are 
not clear.  It is possible that anticipatory processing, which consists of intrusive image-
based and verbal stimuli, consumes attentional resources and impairs the ability for 
concurrent task processing (e.g., Eysenck et al., 2007).  Thus, HSAs have fewer resources 
available in which to process stimuli that could contradict their negative expectations, 
and information processing becomes automatic and stimulus-driven (e.g., Amir & 
Bomyea, 2011; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Eysenck et al., 2007; Teachman, Joormann, 
Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012).  These automatic processes default to threatening appraisals 
and negative memories, resulting in the further maintenance of SAD symptoms.   
Studies on worry (Hayes, Hirsch, & Mathews, 2008) and rumination (Joormann, 
Levens, & Gotlib, 2011) have suggested that those styles of RNT can interfere with 
working memory.  Specifically, those high in worry demonstrated impaired working 
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memory performance when worrying compared to low worriers (Hayes et al., 2008), 
whereas those with major depressive disorder had greater difficulty manipulating verbal 
information than nondepressed controls, especially when the verbal information was 
negative (Joorman et al., 2011).  Both studies suggest that trait symptoms and state 
mental activity interact to disproportionately interfere with working memory capacity in 
those with symptoms of psychopathology.  Although examining similar research 
questions in anticipatory processing is intuitive, it has only been inferred that anticipatory 
processing consumes attentional resources.   
Current Study 
Therefore, one purpose of the current study was to evaluate the degree of working 
memory impairment that results from engaging in anticipatory processing.  Evidence of 
impairment can provide specific information about how anticipatory processing 
maintains symptoms of SAD.  As predicted by theories of working memory and anxiety, 
an increase in cognitive load from anticipatory processing may reduce the available 
resources needed in order to focus on the interaction, inhibit intrusive anxious thoughts, 
and/or shift attention from internal physiology to other stimuli.  With few available 
cognitive resources, HSAs are left to rely on automatic processes (e.g., Teachman et al., 
2012) to process emotional threat information.  In other words, there are an abundance of 
consequences associated with impaired attentional functioning due to anticipatory 
processing, but no research has taken the first step to determine if this impairment is 
present.  
This study also will examine if impairment is primarily related to verbal working 
memory, visual working memory, or if impairment is equal between the two.  There are 
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significant implications for each potential outcome.  An abundance of research has 
suggested that imagery results in more negative affect compared to verbal stimuli 
(Brozovich & Heimberg, 2013; Lang & McTeague, 2009; Mathews, Ridgeway, & 
Holmes, 2013; McTeague & Lang, 2012; McTeague, Lang, Laplante, Cuthbert, & 
Strauss, 2009; Vassilopoulos, 2005).  Other evidence suggests that repetitive verbal 
thinking (e.g., worry) may serve as a form of avoidance from distressing imagery (e.g., 
Borcovec, Alcaine, & Behar, 2004) or significant negative changes in affect (Newman & 
Llera, 2011).  It currently is unclear if anticipatory processing is predominately verbal or 
image-based, as qualitative descriptions of the process (e.g., Clark & Wells, 1995; 
Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003) provide both image (e.g., “think of how you will appear to 
others”) and verbal (e.g., “rehearse what you are going to say”) content.  It is possible 
that anticipatory processing is characterized by both verbal and visual stimuli, which 
would distinguish it from primarily-verbal (e.g., worry; Langlois, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 
2000) and primarily image-based (e.g., obsessions in obsessive-compulsive disorder; 
Langlois et al., 2000) forms of RNT.  In partial support of this, Lang and McTeague 
(2009) have suggested that SAD falls between the fear/imagery and distress/verbal 
extremes on the spectrum of anxiety disorders.  The current study will help to advance 
the SAD and RNT literatures by examining the verbal and/or imagery impairment that 
anticipatory processing produces.  It also can provide information about the specific 
results of anticipatory processing on working memory performance.  
In the proposed study, participants who score high (HSA) or low (LSA) on a 
measure of social anxiety symptoms will be informed that they will be engaging in a 
social interaction later in the study.  Then, they will be instructed to engage in an 
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anticipatory processing or distraction task (Appendix B), which includes thinking 
prompts related to the upcoming social interaction (Anticipation task; Hinrichsen & 
Clark, 2003; Mills et al., 2014a; 2014b) or random visual stimuli (e.g., the shape of 
Africa; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993).  Finally, they completed counterbalanced 
verbal (e.g., recall a series of words) and visual (e.g., recall a visual pattern) working 
memory tasks in order to determine if anticipatory processing results in impairment in 
verbal performance, visual performance, or both.  
Hypotheses 
Social Anxiety Group Effects.  Consistent with predictions of attentional control 
theory, which suggests anxious participants recruit compensatory resources to complete 
tasks while anxious, we expect no overall differences between participants high and low 
in social anxiety symptoms.  
Visual Impairment.  Because mental imagery appears to be particularly 
problematic in social anxiety (Heimberg et al., 2010), we expect that visual task 
performance will be more impaired than verbal task performance for those engaging in 
anticipatory processing.   
SA Group X Condition Interaction.  We expect SA group to moderate the 
condition effects such that HSAs will experience more impairment when engaging in AP 
than HSAs in the control condition and LSA participants in either condition.  





THINKING PROMPTS FOR BOTH CONDITIONS 
 
Anticipatory Processing Instructions (Hinrichsen & Clark, 2003) 
I would like you to prepare for the upcoming interaction by following the steps below. As 
you read the prompts, use your imagination and concentration to focus your mind on each 
of the ideas.  
 
• Think about/imagine a social situation in which you felt that others formed an 
unfavorable impression of you. 
• Think about/imagine how you looked to others during that particular situation? 
• Think about/imagine how you are going to look during the upcoming interaction.  
• Think about/imagine what could go wrong during the interaction. 
• Think about/imagine the worst thing that could happen during the interaction. 
• Think about/imagine what you would have to do if you made a fool of yourself.  
 
 
Distraction Instructions (from Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993) 
I would like you to prepare for the upcoming interaction by following the steps below. As 
you read the prompts, use your imagination and concentration to focus your mind on each 
of the ideas.  
• Think about/imagine a double-decker bus driving down a street. 
• Think about/imagine a boat slowly crossing the Atlantic ocean. 
• Think about/imagine the shape of the torch of the Statue of Liberty. 
• Think about/imagine the movement of an electric fan on a warm day. 
• Think about/imagine a group of polar bears fishing in a stream. 










ANTICIPATORY SOCIAL BEHAVIOURS QUESTIONNAIRE (HINRICHSEN & 
CLARK, 2003) 
The following items ask you about behaviors, thoughts, and mental images that some 
people have prior to engaging in a social situation. Read each item below and select the 
option that best characterizes what you do prior to a social situation.  
 
1       2   3   4 
               Never         Always 
 
1. I think about similar situations in which I have failed in the past _____ 
 
2. I try to think of everything that could happen _____ 
 
3. I imagine the worst that could happen _____ 
 
4. I go over in detail what might happen _____ 
 
5. I try to picture how I will appear to others _____ 
 
6. I try to plan what I am going to say _____ 
 
7. I rehearse conversations in my mind _____ 
 
8. I remind myself of things I should not do _____ 
 
9. I think about ways in which I could put things right if I make a fool of myself _____ 
 
10. I think about ways in which I could avoid having to face the situation _____ 
 
11. I think about ways in which I could escape from the situation if it gets too embarrassing 
_____ 
 








ATTENTIONAL CONTROL SCALE (ACS; DERRYBERRY & REED, 2002) 
 
Here are some different ways that people can feel about working and concentrating. 
Please indicate how strongly each statement applies to you.   
 
1 = Almost never  2 = Sometimes  3 = Often  4 = Always 
               
1. It’s very hard for me to concentrate on a difficult task     1    2    3    4   
      when there are noises around. 
2. When I need to concentrate and solve a problem,             1    2    3    4                   
     I have trouble focusing my attention. 
3. When I am working hard on something,     1    2    3    4      
     I still get distracted by events around me. 
4. My concentration is good even if     1    2    3    4    
    there is music in the room around me. 
5. When concentrating, I can focus my attention so that   1    2    3    4       
     I become unaware of what’s going on in the room around me.  
6. When I am reading or studying, I am easily distracted  1    2    3    4      
      if there are people talking in the same room. 
7. When trying to focus my attention on something,                1    2    3    4               
    I have difficulty blocking out distracting thoughts. 
8. I have a hard time concentrating when     1    2    3    4      
      I’m excited about something. 
9. When concentrating I ignore feelings of hunger or thirst.  1    2    3    4       
10. I can quickly switch from one task to another.    1    2    3    4 
11. It takes me a while to get really involved in a new task.  1    2    3    4  
12. It is difficult for me to coordinate my attention between       1    2    3    4            
           the listening and writing required when taking notes  
           during lectures. 
13. I can become interested in a new topic very quickly   1    2    3    4  
      when I need to.    
14. It is easy for me to read or write while I’m also talking   1    2    3    4   
        on the phone.    
15. I have trouble carrying on two conversations at once.   1    2    3    4  
16. I have a hard time coming up with new ideas quickly  1    2    3    4  
17. After being interrupted or distracted, I can easily   1    2    3    4  
    shift my attention back to what I was doing before. 
18. When a distracting thought comes to mind, it is easy   1    2    3    4  
       for me to shift my attention away from it. 
19. It is easy for me to alternate between two different tasks.  1    2    3    4  
20. It is hard for me to break from one way of thinking about 1    2    3    4  






CENTER FOR EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES - DEPRESSION SCALE (CES-D; 
RADLOFF, 1977) 
Below is a list of the ways you might have felt or behaved. Please tell me how often you 
have felt this way in the past week. 
DURING THE PAST WEEK 
 
 Rarely or none   Some or a little         Occasionally or a       Most or all 
    of the time       of the time    moderate amount of time       of the time 
(less than 1 day)              (1 – 2 days)                        (3 – 4 days)      (5 – 7 days) 
 
 0   1         2    3 
 
______  1. I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me. 
______  2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. 
______  3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family or  
                  friends. 
______  4. I felt I was just as good as other people. 
______  5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. 
______  6. I felt depressed. 
______  7. I felt that everything I did was an effort. 
______  8. I felt hopeful about the future. 
______  9. I thought my life had been a failure. 
______ 10. I felt fearful. 
______ 11. My sleep was restless. 
______ 12. I was happy. 
______ 13. I talked less than usual. 
______ 14. I felt lonely. 
______ 15. People were unfriendly. 
______ 16. I enjoyed life. 
______ 17. I had crying spells. 
______ 18. I felt sad. 
______ 19. I felt that people dislike me. 









THE COGNITIVE FAILURES QUESTIONNAIRE (BROADBENT, COOPER, 
FITZGERALD & PARKES, 1982) 
 
The following questions are about minor mistakes which everyone makes from time to 
time, but some of which happen more often than others. We want to know how often 
these things have happened to you in the past 6 months.  Please circle the appropriate 
number. 
 











1. Do you read something and find 
you haven’t been thinking about 
it and must read it again? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
2. Do you find you forget why you 
went from one part of the house 
to the other? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
3. Do you fail to notice signposts on 
the road? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
4. Do you find you confuse right 
and left when giving directions? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
5.   Do you bump into people?     4     3     2     1     0 
6. Do you find you forget whether 
you’ve turned off a light or a fire 
or locked the door? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
7. Do you fail to listen to people’s 
names when you are meeting 
them? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
8. Do you say something and realize 
afterwards that it might be taken 
as insulting? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
9. Do you fail to hear people 
speaking to you when you are 
doing something else? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
10. Do you lose your temper and 
regret it? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
11. Do you leave important letters 
unanswered for days? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
12. Do you find you forget which 
way to turn on a road you know 
well but rarely use? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
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13. Do you fail to see what you want 
in a supermarket (although it’s 
there)? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
14. Do you find yourself suddenly 
wondering whether you’ve used a 
word correctly? 
 
    4     3     2     1     0 
15. Do you have trouble making up 
your mind? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
16. Do you find you forget 
appointments? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
17. Do you forget where you put 
something like a newspaper or a 
book? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
18. Do you find you accidentally 
throw away the thing you want 
and keep what you meant to 
throw away – as in the example 
of throwing away the matchbox 
and putting the used match in 
your pocket? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
19. Do you daydream when you 
ought to be listening to 
something? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
20. Do you find you forget people’s 
names? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
21. Do you start doing one thing at 
home and get distracted into 
doing something else 
(unintentionally)? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
22. Do you find you can’t quite 
remember something although 
it’s “on the tip of your tongue”? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
23. Do you find you forget what you 
came to the shops to buy? 
    4     3     2     1     0 
24. Do you drop things?     4     3     2     1     0 
25. Do you find you can’t think of 
anything to say? 










What is your gender identity?:       
_____ Female 
_____ Female to male transgender 
_____ Male 
_____ Male to female transgender 
_____ Not sure 
_____ Other (please specify _____________) 
 





Age: ___________        
 
Ethnicity (check all that apply) 
_____ Caucasian                   _____ Latino/Latina 
_____ African American        _____ Chicano/Chicana 
_____ Asian                          _____ Middle Eastern 
_____ Native American/American Indian/Alaskan Native 
_____ Pacific Islander   
_____ Other (Please specify: ______________) 
         
 
Place of Birth: _____________________    Primary Language: _________________ 
 
High School GPA: ______________          College GPA: ________________ 
 
Year in School:  ______ Freshman 
   ______ Sophomore 
   ______ Junior 
   ______ Senior 







EXTENDED POST-EVENT PROCESSING QUESTIONNAIRE (E-PEPQ; FEHM ET 
AL., 2008) 
 
We would like you to remember one specific social situation, which has led to 
unreasonably 
strong or unrealistic anxiety or discomfort or in which you had a strong feeling of shame. 
Please let yourself be guided by the situations listed below. The situation should have 
been 
of personal relevance to you, and it should have happened during the past six months. If 
you 
remember more than one situation, please choose the one that was most relevant for you. 
 
1) Please mark the situation you have chosen and remember to refer to this situation 
while 
answering questions 2 – 18.  
 
☐ Talking in front of a group ☐ being at a party  ☐ talking to 
authorities;  
☐ participating in group activities ☐ using public restrooms ☐ returning goods to a 
store 
☐ expressing disapproval   ☐ talking on the phone ☐ dating someone 
☐ formal and informal meetings ☐ oral exams   ☐ giving a party 
☐ eating/drinking/writing in public ☐ being criticized   
☐ initiating a romantic relationship ☐ beginning maintaining a conversation  
☐ talking on the phone with others listening 
☐ other situation (please describe ____________________________) 
 
Answer the remaining questions on the following scale: 




    
2)  After the event was over, how much did you think about it? 
3)  How much did your memories and thoughts about the event keep coming into your 
head even when you did not wish to think about it again? 
4)  How much did the thoughts about the event interfere with your concentration? 
5)  How difficult was it to forget about the event? 
6)  How much did you try to resist thinking about the event? 
7)  If you repeatedly thought about the event, did your feelings about the event worsen? 
8)  How much have you wondered about whether you could have avoided or prevented 
your behavior/feelings during the event? 
9)  How much did you wish that you could turn the clock back and do it again but better 
this time? 
10)  As a result of the event, are you now avoiding similar situations? 
11)  How much did this event reinforce your pre-existing avoidance of similar situations? 
12)  How much shame do you experience while remembering your behavior during the 
situation? 
13)  How much do you think about anxious feelings that you had experienced during the 
event? 
14)  When remembering this situation, how much do other past failures that you have 
experienced in the same way come into your mind? 
15)  How much do you criticize yourself for your behavior in the situation? 
16)  To what extent do you think about the event more than you want to? 
17)  To what extent do you think about bodily sensations you had experienced in the 
situation? 
18)  In your memories about the event, how much do you see yourself/your 






PENN STATE WORRY QUESTIONNAIRE (PSWQ;  MEYER, MILLER, METZGER, 
& BORKOVEC, 1990) 
Enter the number that best describes how typical or characteristic each item is of you, 
putting the number next to the item. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 




 Very typical 
_________ 1. If I do not have enough time to do everything, I do not worry about it. 
_________ 2. My worries overwhelm me. 
_________ 3. I do not tend to worry about things. 
_________ 4. Many situations make me worry. 
_________ 5. I know I should not worry about things, but I just cannot help it. 
_________ 6. When I am under pressure, I worry a lot. 
_________ 7. I am always worrying about something. 
_________ 8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts. 
_________ 9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry about everything else I have to 
do. 
_________ 10. I never worry about anything. 
_________ 11. When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I do not worry about 
it anymore.   
_________ 12. I have been a worrier all my life. 
_________ 13. I notice that I have been worrying about things. 
_________ 14. Once I start worrying, I cannot stop. 
_________ 15. I worry all the time. 











RUMINATIVE RESPONSES SCALE (RRS; NOLEN-HOEKSEMA & MORROW, 
1991; TREYNOR, ET AL.,  2003) 
 
People think and do many different things when they feel down, sad, or depressed.  
Please read each of the items below and indicate whether you never, sometimes, often, or 
always think or do when you feel down, sad, or depressed.  Please indicate what you 
generally do, not what you think you should do. 
   1  2  3  4 
  Almost Never      Sometimes         Often        Almost Always 
1. Think “What am I doing to deserve this?” ______ 
2. Analyze recent events to try to understand why you are anxious in social 
situations ______ 
3. Think “Why do I always react this way?” ______ 
4. Go away by yourself and think about why you feel this way ______ 
5. Write down what you are thinking and analyze it ______ 
6. Think about a recent situation, wishing it had gone better ______ 
7. Think “Why do I have problems other people don’t have?” ______ 
8. Think “Why can’t I handle things better?” ______ 
9. Analyze your personality to try to understand why you are anxious in social 
situations ______ 














SOCIAL INTERACTION ANXIETY SCALE, STRAIGHTFORWARD VERSION (S-
SIAS; MATTICK & CLARKE, 1998; RODEBAUGH ET AL., 2007) 
 
For each question, please circle a number to indicate the degree to which you feel the 
statement is characteristic or true of you.  The rating scale is as follows: 
 
0 = Not at all characteristic or true of me 3 = Very characteristic or true of me 
1 = Slightly characteristic or true of me 4 = Extremely characteristic or true of me 
2 = Moderately characteristic or true of me 
 
 
1.  I get nervous if I have to speak with someone in authority 
(teacher, boss, etc.) 
0 1 2 3 4 
2.  I have difficulty making eye-contact with others. 0 1 2 3 4 
3.  I become tense if I have to talk about myself or my feelings. 0 1 2 3 4 
4.  I find difficulty mixing comfortably with the people I work 
with. 
0 1 2 3 4 
5.  I tense-up if I meet an acquaintance on the street. 0 1 2 3 4 
6.  When mixing socially, I am uncomfortable. 0 1 2 3 4 
7.  I feel tense if I am alone with just one person. 0 1 2 3 4 
8.  I have difficulty talking with other people. 0 1 2 3 4 
9.  I worry about expressing myself in case I appear awkward. 0 1 2 3 4 
10.  I find it difficult to disagree with another’s point of view. 0 1 2 3 4 
11.  I have difficulty talking to an attractive person of the 
opposite sex. 
0 1 2 3 4 
12.  I find myself worrying that I won’t know what to say in 
social situations. 
0 1 2 3 4 
13.  I am nervous mixing with people I don’t know well. 0 1 2 3 4 
14.  I feel I’ll say something embarrassing when talking. 0 1 2 3 4 
15.  When mixing in a group, I find myself worrying I will be 
ignored. 
0 1 2 3 4 
16.  I am tense mixing in a group. 0 1 2 3 4 
















This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions.  
Please read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space next to that 
word.  Indicate to what extent you feel this was RIGHT NOW, that is, HOW YOU 
FEEL AT THIS MOMENT.  Use the following scale to indicate your answers: 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 1  2  3  4  5 
  very slightly         a little          moderately     quite a bit           extremely 
  or not at all 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_____interested     _____irritable 
 
_____distressed     _____alert 
 
_____excited      _____ashamed 
 
_____upset      _____inspired 
 
_____strong      _____nervous 
 
_____guilty      _____determined 
 
_____scared      _____attentive 
 
_____hostile      _____jittery 
 
_____enthusiastic     _____active 
 
_____proud      _____afraid 
 








STRATEGY USE QUESTIONNAIRE (BROWN & WESLEY, 2013) 
 
STQ - Visual Task Version 
 
1. Please rate the extent to which you relied upon a visual and/or verbal strategy to help you 
remember the checkered patterns. A visual strategy involves concentrating on your mental 
image of what the pattern looks like. A verbal strategy involves verbalizing the features of the 
pattern and concentrating on that verbal information. 
1) I used a verbal strategy only 
2) I used mostly verbal but some visual rehearsal 
3) I used verbal and visual strategies equally 
4) I used mostly visual but some verbal rehearsal 
5) I used a visual strategy only 
 
2. To what extent did you combine visual and verbal strategies to help remember the 
patterns? 
  1) Always   2) Most of the time  3) Sometimes   4) Rarely   5)Never 
 
3. To what extent did you count up the number of black cells? 
 1) Always   2) Most of the time  3) Sometimes   4) Rarely   5)Never 
 
4. To what extent did you attach verbal labels to some of the individual shapes? (e.g., naming 
a 
collection of black cells the letter L) 
 1) Always   2) Most of the time  3) Sometimes   4) Rarely   5)Never 
 
5. To what extent did you focus upon refreshing your mental image of the pattern? 
     1) Always   2) Most of the time  3) Sometimes   4) Rarely   5)Never 
 
STQ – Verbal Task Version 
 
1. Please rate the extent to which you relied upon a visual and/or verbal strategy to help you 
remember the words. A visual strategy involves concentrating on your mental image of what 
the pattern looks like. A verbal strategy involves verbalizing the features of the pattern and 
concentrating on that verbal information. 
1) I used a verbal strategy only 
2) I used mostly verbal but some visual rehearsal 
3) I used verbal and visual strategies equally 
4) I used mostly visual but some verbal rehearsal 
5) I used a visual strategy only 
 
2. To what extent did you combine visual and verbal strategies to help remember the words? 
  1) Always   2) Most of the time  3) Sometimes   4) Rarely   5)Never 
 
3. To what extent did you focus upon refreshing your mental image of the words? 





MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONNAIRE 
During the imagination task, were you asked to think about/imagine:  
 
…raindrops sliding down a windowpane? Yes No 
… the layout of a typical classroom? Yes No 
…how you are going to appear during the upcoming social interaction? Yes No 
… your character and who you strive to be? Yes No 
… clouds forming in the sky? Yes No 
… a gas station on the side of a highway? Yes No 
… a specific social situation that you felt did not go well? Yes No 
… a clown putting on his or her make-up? Yes No 
… the worst thing that could happen during the social interaction? Yes No 
… what you would have to do if you made a fool of yourself? Yes No 
… the shape of the continent Africa? Yes No 
… the expectations your family has for you? Yes No 
… what could go wrong during the social interaction? Yes No 
… your appearance during a past social situation? Yes No 
… a train stopped at a station? Yes No 
… the baggage claim at the airport? Yes No 
… objects that are in rooms in your house? Yes No 
 















Please continue to the next page 
 














Throughout the duration of the study, how much did you believe that you would be 
participating in a social interaction?  Using the scale below, please choose one number 




























I was completely convinced there WOULD be an interaction 
 
 
I was pretty sure there WOULD be an interaction 
 
I was not sure either way 
 
I was pretty sure there would NOT be an interaction 
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